Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law

Research Centers & Programs

12-2022

Liability for Public Deception: Linking Fossil Fuel Disinformation
to Climate Damages
Jessica A. Wentz
Columbia Law School, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law

Benjamin Franta
University of Oxford

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sabin_climate_change
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Jessica Wentz and Benjamin Franta, Liability for Public Deception: Linking Fossil Fuel Disinformation to
Climate Damages, 52 Envtl. L. Rep. 10995 (December 2022)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Centers & Programs at Scholarship Archive.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Sabin Center for Climate Change Law by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Copyright © 2022 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

LIABILITY FOR PUBLIC DECEPTION:
LINKING FOSSIL FUEL
DISINFORMATION TO
CLIMATE DAMAGES
by Jessica Wentz and Benjamin Franta
Jessica Wentz is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Sabin Center for Climate Change
Law at Columbia University. Benjamin Franta is a Senior Research Fellow in Climate
Litigation in the Sustainable Law Programme at the University of Oxford.

SUMMARY
Over two dozen U.S. states and municipalities have filed lawsuits against fossil fuel companies, seeking abatement orders and compensation for climate damages based on theories such as public nuisance, negligence,
and failure to warn, and alleging these companies knew about the dangers of their products, intentionally
concealed those dangers, created doubt about climate science, and undermined public support for climate
action. This Article examines how tort plaintiffs can establish a causal nexus between public deception and
damages, drawing from past litigation, particularly claims filed against manufacturers for misleading the
public about the risks of tobacco, lead paint, and opioids. A key finding is that courts may infer public reliance
on false and misleading statements using multiple lines of evidence, including information about the scope
and magnitude of the deceptive communications, defendants’ internal assessments of the efficacy of their
disinformation campaigns, acknowledgements of intended reliance made by defendants, expert testimony on
the effects of disinformation, public polling data, and more. The Article concludes with a discussion of these
potential strategies and evidentiary sources.

C

oncern continues to grow over the role of misinformation and disinformation in public discourse
surrounding matters of societal importance.
Although not a new problem, digital communications
and social media platforms have enabled the rapid diffusion of false and misleading information,1 and various
Authors' Note: We would like to extend our gratitude to other
legal scholars and practitioners who contributed to this project.
Special thanks to Michael Burger, who helped identify the need
for this research and gave extensive feedback on the Article.
We also appreciate the contributions of Robert Proctor, Richard
Daynard, and Randy Rosenblum, who provided valuable insights
based on their experiences with tobacco litigation. Finally, thank
you to the organizers and attendees of the Harvard University
workshop, Accountability for the Deception Industry, which provided a forum for discussing legal issues and evidentiary needs
in public deception lawsuits.
Editor's Note: Benjamin Franta serves as a consulting expert and
has participated in the preparation of amicus briefs on the issues
discussed in this Article and cited herein.
1.

Danielle Caled & Mario J. Silva, Digital Media and Misinformation: An
Outlook on Multidisciplinary Strategies Against Manipulation, 5 J. Computational Soc. Sci. 123 (2022).

12-2022

political, ideological, and commercial actors have taken
advantage of these online tools to mislead the public.2
Commentators have highlighted the need for governance approaches and legal tools to help the public and
policymakers navigate this landscape and to hold actors
accountable for disinformation.3
Existing laws may provide a basis for imposing liability
on actors when they undertake deliberate campaigns to
disinform the public.4 State and municipal governments
are currently testing legal theories in lawsuits filed against
2.
3.

4.

Ulises A. Mejias & Nikolai E. Vokuev, Disinformation and the Media: The
Case of Russia and Ukraine, 39 Media Culture & Soc’y 1027 (2017).
See, e.g., John Bowers & Jonathan Zittrain, Answering Impossible Questions:
Content Governance in an Age of Disinformation, 1 Harv. Kennedy Sch.
Misinformation Rev. 1 (2020); Chris Tenove, Protecting Democracy From
Disinformation: Normative Threats and Policy Responses, 25 Int’l J. Press/
Pol. 517 (2020); Wes Henricksen, Disinformation and the First Amendment:
Fraud on the Public, St. John’s L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022).
Legal scholars have taken different positions on whether and to what extent
tort law can be used to impose liability on actors who deceive the public
about product risks. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Public Nuisance Law When
Politics Fails (Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 21-14, 2021)
(discussing how public nuisance law can be used to hold actors accountable
for the deceptive marketing of products that create ongoing public health
and/or environmental harm); Wes Henricksen, Deceive, Profit, Repeat: Public Deception Schemes to Conceal Product Dangers, 42 Cardozo L. Rev. 2395
(2021) (arguing that tort law does not provide a sufficient framework for
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fossil fuel companies for their documented disinformation efforts. The complaints allege that the defendant
companies have violated state consumer protection and
tort laws by deceiving the public about the dangers of fossil fuels and climate change in order to maximize the sale
of their products.
These lawsuits raise questions related to the scope of liability and First Amendment protections for defendants in
public deception lawsuits. One critical question is whether
the plaintiffs will be able to prove that the defendants’ false
and misleading statements contributed to climate changerelated injuries at the state and local levels. Proof of causation and injury will be required for tort claims, and may
also be required for consumer protection claims where statutes require a showing of actual harm.
Many legal scholars have acknowledged the challenges
of using tort law and litigation against corporate actors to
address the enormous problem of climate change.5 At the
same time, scholars have recognized that there is a logical basis for pursuing certain types of claims, particularly
public nuisance and consumer protection claims, since
these deal with harm to the public rather than individual
injury.6 Much has been written on the challenge of establishing causation in climate torts between global climate
change and specific injuries,7 but the challenge of linking
disinformation to climate change-related injuries remains
less examined.
This Article examines how plaintiffs may establish a
causal nexus between public deception and harm in cases
involving liability for disinformation.8 We focus on fossil fuel disinformation lawsuits and the public nuisance
claims raised therein, but our analysis is also relevant to
other cases involving liability for public deception. Part I
begins with a summary of the legal claims, factual allegations, and elements related to causation in the fossil fuel
disinformation cases.
Part II discusses lessons learned from other cases
where plaintiffs have sued product manufacturers for

5.

6.

7.

8.

addressing public deception schemes and advocating for legislation to close
gaps in tort law).
See, e.g., Douglas Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law,
41 Env’t L. 1 (2011); Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate
Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 12 (2012);
Albert C. Lin & Michael Burger, State Public Nuisance Claims and Climate
Change Adaptation, 36 Pace Env’t L. Rev. 49 (2018); Thomas W. Merrill,
Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 Colum. J. Env’t L. 293 (2005).
See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 5, at 13 (recognizing that public nuisance would
be “the logical cause of action to pursue, since it imports a duty to avoid
injurious conduct to rights that are held by the public in common”); Lin &
Burger, supra note 5, at 56 (explaining that public nuisance “arguably offers
the advantage of allowing plaintiffs to direct courts’ attention to the severity
of the harms suffered rather than on the balancing of those harms against
the social benefit of defendants’ conduct”).
Kysar, supra note 5, at 39; Vincent S. Oleszkiewicz & Douglas B. Sanders, The Advent of Climate Change Litigation Against Corporate Defendants,
35 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2365, 2369 (Nov. 12, 2004); Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1605
(2007).
Plaintiffs may also face challenges establishing a causal link between global
climate change, local impacts, and injuries. This Article does not comment
on that causation challenge, but it is addressed in other scholarship. See
Michael Burger et al., The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribution,
45 Colum. J. Env’t L. 57 (2020); Kysar, supra note 5.
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misleading the public about harmful products, including tobacco, lead paint, and opioids. These cases suggest that plaintiffs may need to provide evidence that
the defendants’ false or misleading communications
influenced public understanding and/or conduct, but
plaintiffs probably will not need to demonstrate individual reliance on specific claims comparable to what is
required for fraud claims. These cases also illustrate how
public reliance and other aspects of causation may be
inferred using multiple lines of evidence, including but
not limited to information about the scope and magnitude of deceptive communications (e.g., amounts of
promotional spending and targeting of specific populations), internal assessments of the efficacy of defendants’
messaging campaigns, acknowledgements of intended
reliance made by defendants in depositions, expert testimony on causation, and public polling data.
Part III offers a discussion of existing research, discovery
approaches, and expert testimony that plaintiffs could use
to demonstrate the influence of defendants’ disinformation
efforts on public understanding and responses to climate
change. Part IV concludes.

I.

Fossil Fuel Disinformation Lawsuits:
Legal Claims, Factual Allegations,
and Causation Issues

In 2015, journalists at the Los Angeles Times and the
Columbia School of Journalism simultaneously published the results of independent investigations with the
same shocking findings: newly discovered archival documents showed that major fossil fuel companies, including the largest publicly traded oil company in the world,
ExxonMobil, held a sophisticated internal understanding of global warming—and the role of the industry’s
products in causing it—as early as the late 1970s.9 These
revelations recast the public’s understanding of fossil fuel
companies’ long-standing and well-documented efforts
to dispute the reliability of climate science and delay fossil fuel controls to address global warming, enhanced the
basis for imposing legal liability on the industry, and catalyzed additional research efforts focused on uncovering
the details of the companies’ activities related to climate
change over time.10
These and other research efforts have provided much
of the evidentiary foundation for a new wave of litigation
aimed at holding fossil fuel companies accountable for
the harmful effects of their products and disinformation

9.

Sara Jerving et al., What Exxon Knew About the Earth’s Melting Arctic,
L.A. Times (Oct. 9, 2015), https://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-arctic/;
Katie Jennings et al., How Exxon Went From Leader to Skeptic on Climate
Change Research, L.A. Times (Oct. 23, 2015), https://graphics.latimes.
com/exxon-research/; Neela Banerjee et al., Exxon: The Road Not Taken,
Inside Climate News (2015), https://insideclimatenews.org/project/
exxon-the-road-not-taken/.
10. See, e.g., Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Assessing ExxonMobil’s Climate
Change Communications (1977-2014), 12 Env’t Rsch. Letters 084019
(2017).
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efforts. Since 2017, at least 20 municipalities, six states,
the District of Columbia, and one trade association in
the United States have filed lawsuits seeking to hold fossil fuel companies accountable for contributions to climate change and associated damages.11 The plaintiffs in
these cases have asserted causes of action arising under
state common law, including public nuisance, private
nuisance, negligence, trespass, design defect, and failure
to warn, as well as violations of state consumer protection statutes.
Recognizing that it may not be possible to hold fossil fuel companies strictly liable for emissions from their
products, the plaintiffs have alleged that these companies
contributed to the climate crisis through false and deceptive practices as well as through the manufacture and
sale of their products. The remedies requested include
compensatory damages, the establishment of abatement
funds to finance adaptation measures such as seawalls,
disgorgement of profits, and other forms of equitable and
financial relief.12
Although different legal theories are being tested in these
lawsuits, there is considerable overlap in the factual allegations that appear in the plaintiffs’ complaints and opening
briefs. The following allegations from the complaint filed
in City & County of Honolulu v. Sunoco are illustrative of
issues raised across different cases:
1. Defendants went to great lengths to understand
the hazards associated with, and either knew or
should have known of the dangers associated
with, their fossil fuel products.
2. Defendants did not disclose known harms associated with the extraction, promotion, and
consumption of their fossil fuel products, and
instead affirmatively acted to obscure those harms
and engaged in a concerted campaign to evade
regulation.
3. In contrast to their public statements, defendants’
internal actions demonstrate their awareness of
and intent to profit from the unabated use of fossil fuel products.
4. Defendants’ actions have exacerbated the costs of
adapting to and mitigating the adverse impacts of
the climate crisis.

11. See Center for Climate Integrity, Climate Liability Litigation, https://climateintegrity.org/cases (last visited Oct. 6, 2022).
12. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint ¶ 11, City of San Francisco v. BP, No.
3:17-cv06012-WHA (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2018) [hereinafter San Francisco
Am. Complaint]; First Amended Complaint ¶ 11, City of Oakland v.
BP, No. 3:17-cv-06011-WHA (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Oakland Am. Complaint]; Complaint §VII, County of San Mateo v. Chevron
Corp., No. 3:17-cv-04929 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2017) [hereinafter San
Mateo Complaint]; Complaint §VII, City and County of Honolulu v.
Sunoco LP, No. 1CCV-20-0000380 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Mar. 9, 2020) [hereinafter Honolulu Complaint]; Complaint ¶ 253, City of Annapolis v. BP,
No. C-02-CV-21-000250 (Md. Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 2021) [hereinafter Annapolis Complaint].
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5. Defendants continue to mislead about the impact
of their fossil fuel products on climate change
through greenwashing campaigns and other misleading advertisements.13
The complaints cite industry reports, internal documents, peer-reviewed studies, and many other sources of
factual support to substantiate the allegations of defendants’ conduct and knowledge.14 In some cases, experts
have also submitted amicus curiae briefs documenting how
the defendants willfully concealed the risks associated with
fossil fuel use and climate change.15 Thus, the evidentiary
foundation for the claims regarding defendants’ conduct
and knowledge appears quite robust. However, the complaints and briefs contain relatively less information about
the effect of disinformation on public perception and
responses to climate change. The plaintiffs will have the
opportunity to submit additional evidence on this topic
when and if the cases go to trial.
The evidentiary requirements for causation will depend
on the jurisdiction and the type of claim. For tort claims
in many states, the plaintiffs must show that the defendant’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in causing harm.16
In contrast, for violations of consumer protection laws,
plaintiffs must typically establish that the defendant made
a “material” misrepresentation that is capable of influenc13. Honolulu Complaint, supra note 12. Similar language appears in San Mateo
Complaint, supra note 12; Annapolis Complaint, supra note 12; Complaint,
Pacific Coast Fed. of Fisherman’s Ass’ns v. Chevron, No. CGC-18-571285
(Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018) [hereinafter Pacific Coast Federation Complaint]; Complaint, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716
(R.I. Super. Ct. July 2, 2018) [hereinafter Rhode Island Complaint]; Complaint, Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP, No. 24-C-18-004219
(Md. Cir. Ct. July 20, 2018) [hereinafter Baltimore Complaint]; Complaint, Anne Arundel Cnty. v. BP p.l.c., No. C-02-CV-21-000565 (Md.
Cir. Ct. Apr. 26, 2021) [hereinafter Anne Arundel Complaint]; Amended
Complaint, Board of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy,
No. 2018-CV-030349 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 11, 2018) [hereinafter Boulder
Am. Complaint]; Complaint, State of Minnesota v. American Petroleum
Inst., No. 62-CV-20-3837 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 24, 2020) [hereinafter
Minnesota Complaint]; Complaint, City of Hoboken v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., No. HUD-L-003179-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. Sept. 2, 2020) [hereinafter
Hoboken Complaint]; Complaint, State of Delaware v. BP, No. N20C-09097 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2020) [hereinafter Delaware Complaint];
Complaint, City of Charleston v. Brabham Oil Co., No. 2020-CP-1003975
(S.C. Ct. Com. Sept. 9, 2020) [hereinafter Charleston Complaint].
14. See, e.g., Honolulu Complaint, supra note 12, ¶ 48 (citing Benjamin Franta,
Early Oil Industry Knowledge of CO2 and Global Warming, 8 Nature Climate Change 1024 (2018)), ¶ 58 (citing Committee for Air and Water
Conservation & Committee on Public Affairs, American Petroleum
Institute, Environmental Research: A Status Report (1972), http://
files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED066339.pdf; Memo from J.F. Black, Scientific
Advisor, Exxon Research and Engineering Co., to F.G. Turpin, Vice President, Exxon Research and Engineering Co., The Greenhouse Effect (June 6,
1978), https://www.climatefiles.com/exxonmobil/1978-exxon-memo-ongreenhouse-effect-for-exxon-corporation-management-committee/).
15. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Robert Brule, Center for Climate Integrity, Chesapeake Climate Action Network, Justin Farrell, Benjamin Franta,
Stephan Lewandowsky, Naomi Oreskes, Geoffrey Supran, and the Union
of Concerned Scientists in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee and Affirmance,
Delaware v. BP Am. Inc., No. 22-1096 (3d Cir. filed Apr. 21, 2022); Brief
of Amici Curiae Robert Brule, Center for Climate Integrity, Justin Farrell,
Benjamin Franta, Stephan Lewandowsky, Naomi Oreskes, and Geoffrey
Supran in Support of Appellees and Affirmance, County of San Mateo v.
Chevron, No. 18-15499 (9th Cir. filed Apr. 29, 2019).
16. See, e.g., O’Grady v. State, 398 P.3d 625 (2017), as amended (June 22,
2017); Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Ledesma & Meyer Constr. Co., 418
P.3d 400 (Cal. 2018), as modified (July 25, 2018).
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ing customers, but they do not necessarily need to prove
that the misrepresentation did in fact mislead customers
(although actual harm is a required element for some consumer protection claims).17
This Article focuses on the evidence required to support
tort claims because the standards for establishing causation are more exacting than those that apply to consumer
protection claims. We also focus on a subset of tort claims,
specifically public nuisance and negligent failure to warn,
to provide boundaries for our analysis. But our analysis has
applicability beyond those two causes of action, since the
type of evidence that could be used to demonstrate causation in a public nuisance or failure-to-warn claim could
also be used to support other tort claims as well as consumer protection claims.

A.

Elements of Public Nuisance and
Failure-to-Warn Claims

1.	

Public Nuisance

The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a “public
nuisance” as “an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public.”18 It recognizes several circumstances that may sustain a nuisance finding, including:
(a) whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public health, the public safety,
the public peace, the public comfort or the public
convenience,
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute,
ordinance or administrative regulation, or (c) whether
the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced
a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor
knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect
upon the public right.19

17. There is a distinction between proving reliance and proving harm. Some
states do require proof of individual reliance for violations of unfair and
deceptive practices (UDAP) laws, but the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
Act and most state UDAP laws do not explicitly require consumers to prove
that they specifically relied on the defendant’s deceptive claims. In contrast,
most UDAP laws do require evidence of actual harm, sometimes limiting
relief to consumers who have lost money or property. See National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State
Evaluation of Unfair and Deceptive Practices Laws (2018).
18. Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B (Am. L. Inst. 1979).
19. Id.
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Most states have adopted similarly broad standards for
common-law public nuisance claims,20 often codifying
these standards in civil and criminal codes.21
What qualifies as an “unreasonable interference” with
public rights depends on the jurisdiction and the facts
of the case. The magnitude or significance of harmful
effects, such as public health effects, is clearly relevant to
this analysis.22 Some courts may also employ a balancing
test to evaluate the reasonableness of the interference—for
example, California courts have held that the interference
is substantial if it causes “significant harm,” and unreasonable if its social utility is outweighed by the gravity of the
harm inflicted.23
Courts have long recognized that environmental harms
such as air pollution and water pollution may qualify as
public nuisances.24 Courts have also found public nuisances
where product manufacturers have misled the public about
the dangers of their products.25 However, some jurisdictions limit public nuisance liability to situations where the
defendant has control of the instrument of harm (e.g., the
dangerous product) when it causes the plaintiff’s injury.26
Courts may dismiss public nuisance claims predicated on
public deception due to the “effective control” rule. Courts
have also dismissed nuisance claims that resemble product

20. See, e.g., People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 51, 79
(2017) (“A public nuisance cause of action is established by proof that a
defendant knowingly created or assisted in the creation of a substantial and
unreasonable interference with a public right”); in Littleton v. State, 656
P.2d 1336, 1344-45 (Haw. 1982), a nuisance is
that which unlawfully annoys or does damage to another, anything
that works hurt, inconvenience, or damage, anything which annoys or disturbs one in the free use, possession, or enjoyment of his
property or which renders its ordinary use or physical occupation
uncomfortable, and anything wrongfully done or permitted which
injures or annoys another in the enjoyment of his legal rights
and a public nuisance “must be in a public place, or where the public frequently congregate, or where members of the public are likely to come
within the range of its influence”); Tadjer v. Montgomery Cnty., 479 A.2d
1321, 1327 (Md. 1984) (a public nuisance is “an act or omission ‘which
obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of
rights common to all [people]’”); State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d
428, 446, 38 ELR 20155 (R.I. 2008) (a public nuisance is “an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public” . . . “it is behavior
that unreasonably interferes with the health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the general community”).
21. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code §3479 (defining a nuisance as “[a]nything which
is injurious to health . . . or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the
free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life
or property”); id. §3480 (a public nuisance “is one which affects at the same
time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number
of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon
individuals may be unequal”); Cal. Penal Code §370:
Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent, or offensive
to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by an
entire community or neighborhood, or by any considerable number of persons, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in
the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream,
canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a
public nuisance.
22. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §821F cmts. c & d (Am. L. Inst.
1979).
23. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1105 (1997).
24. Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 1334 (2000).
25. See discussion infra Part II.
26. Id.
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liability or fraud actions due to concerns about “expanding”
public nuisance doctrine beyond traditional applications.27
Causation is an element of a public nuisance claim (i.e.,
“a connecting element to the prohibited harm must be
shown”28). Plaintiffs must establish that the alleged nuisance is the factual cause of their injury, which may involve
demonstrating both general and specific causation. General causation deals with whether the conduct or product
at issue is capable of causing a particular type of injury or
condition. Specific causation deals with whether the defendant’s conduct or product actually caused the plaintiff’s
specific injury. Specific causation is a required element in
toxic tort cases, but it is not always required in other types
of torts such as public nuisance.29
For public nuisance and other tort claims, plaintiffs
must also establish proximate cause. The doctrine of proximate cause is concerned with whether there is a sufficiently
close relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the
plaintiff’s injury such that it is reasonable to impose liability on the defendant. When considering this issue, courts
may consider factors such as the geographic and temporal
proximity between the conduct and injury, whether the
injury is a foreseeable consequence of the conduct, and
whether the injury is “too remote” from the conduct to
impose liability.30
The parameters for establishing proximate cause
depend on the jurisdiction and the cause of action. For
example, California courts have held that proximate cause
in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) claims requires a “direct relationship between the
conduct and injury,” whereas “a public nuisance claim satisfies proximate cause if the defendant’s conduct is likely
to cause a significant invasion of a public right.”31 In other
words, California courts tend to focus on the probability
and foreseeability of harm rather than the directness of
the relationship between conduct and injury when assessing proximate cause in public nuisance claims. However,
California courts will also consider whether the injury is
“too remote” from the conduct and whether there were
any “intervening acts” that would sever the chain of causation, thus undermining claims of both proximate and
factual causation.32
Other jurisdictions have likewise determined that the
proximate cause inquiry should focus on the foreseeability of harm rather than the directness of the relationship

27. Id.
28. In re Firearm Cases, 126 Cal. App. 4th 959, 988 (2005). See also State v.
Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 450, 38 ELR 20155 (R.I. 2008).
29. See Albert Lin, Deciphering the Chemical Soup: Using Public Nuisance to
Compel Chemical Testing, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 955 (2010).
30. See Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of Standing, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1241, 1249 (2011). See also City & Cnty. of San
Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 491 F. Supp. 3d 610, 679 (N.D. Cal.
2020) (discussing proximate cause requirements in the context of a state
public nuisance claim).
31. Purdue Pharma L.P., 491 F. Supp. 3d at 679 (citing Firearm Cases, 126 Cal.
App. 4th at 988).
32. Id. at 676, 679; People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 51
(2017).
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between the conduct and harm.33 The Supreme Court of
Hawaii, for example, held that it was improper to instruct
a jury to find “proximate cause” defined as “that cause
which in direct, unbroken sequence, produces the injury,
and without which the injury would not have occurred.”34
Rather, the court held that it should be enough for the fact
finder to determine that a defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries.35 The court
has acknowledged that the foreseeability of harm is a relevant consideration for both the proximate cause inquiry
and for assessing a defendant’s duty of care.36
In addition, as discussed below, many courts will consider whether the defendant’s conduct was a “substantial
factor” in causing the plaintiff’s injury when there are
multiple factors that contributed to the injury.37 The relationship between the “substantial factor” test and the proximate cause inquiry varies by jurisdiction: some states, like
California, recognize it as the primary basis for ascertaining proximate or “legal” cause in tort litigation.38
Ultimately, there is no bright-line rule for distinguishing a legally sufficient proximate cause from one that is
too remote,39 just as there is no bright-line rule for determining what constitutes a “substantial” contribution to
an injury. The questions of factual and proximate cause
are ordinarily left to the fact finder (although a court may
decide that there is no basis for a rational trier of fact to
find proximate cause).40

2.	

Failure to Warn

A failure-to-warn claim may be premised upon a theory
of negligence or strict liability. The factual elements that
must be proven for such claims are similar regardless of
which theory is used.41 According to the Restatement
(Third) of Torts:
A product . . . is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided
33. See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d at 451 (“The proper inquiry regarding legal cause involves an assessment of foreseeability, in which we
ask whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a
likely result of his conduct.”); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821
N.E.2d 1099, 1127 (Ill. 2004) (same).
34. Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 742 P.2d 377, 387 (Haw. 1987).
35. Id.
36. Id. See also Pulawa v. GTE Hawaiian Tel, 143 P.3d 1205, 1215-16 (Haw.
2006) (discussing different approaches to assessing foreseeability when evaluating proximate cause and duty of care).
37. See infra Section I.B.
38. Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 878 (Cal. 1991).
39. People v. Roberts, 826 P.2d 274, 300 (Cal. 1992), as modified on denial of
reh’g (May 20, 1992); People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 17 Cal. App.
5th 51 (2017).
40. See, e.g., Roberts, 826 P.2d at 311-312; City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc.,
2005 WI App 7, ¶ 18, 278 Wis. 2d 313, 325, 691 N.W.2d 888, 894.
41. Although the elements that must be proven are similar, the choice of legal
theory may affect other aspects of the case. For example: (1) plaintiffs must
establish proximate cause in a negligence case; (2) the defense of contributory negligence may be available for negligence claims in some jurisdictions;
and (3) for strict liability claims, all entities in the marketing chain may
share liability for failure to give adequate warning. 8 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of
Facts 547 (1990).
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by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings
by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the
instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.42

Whereas the Restatement (Second) of Torts described this
as a rule of strict liability,43 the Restatement (Third) of Torts
has recognized that “defects based on inadequate instructions or warnings are predicated on a different concept of
responsibility,” and that imposing liability in this context
“achieve[s] the same general objectives as does liability
predicated on negligence.”44
Many state courts have likewise recognized that the
failure to provide a warning under these circumstances is
tantamount to negligence: the defendant failed to exercise
reasonable care to inform users of the foreseeable danger
associated with use of its product.45 Nonetheless, some
courts still recognize these as distinct causes of action. The
California Supreme Court has explained the distinction
as follows:
Negligence law in a failure-to-warn case requires a plaintiff to prove that a manufacturer or distributor did not
warn of a particular risk for reasons which fell below the
acceptable standard of care, i.e., what a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have known and warned about.
Strict liability is not concerned with the standard of due
care or the reasonableness of a manufacturer’s conduct.
The rules of strict liability require a plaintiff to prove only
that the defendant did not adequately warn of a particular risk that was known or knowable in the light of the
generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and
medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture
and distribution. Thus, in strict liability, as opposed to
negligence, the reasonableness of the defendant’s failure to
warn is immaterial.46

However, other state courts have recognized that the
strict liability cause of action is essentially the same as
a negligence cause of action, since the court must consider whether the product hazard was foreseeable and
whether the defendant’s failure to warn was reasonable
in either context. 47
When courts are determining whether a manufacturer
should have provided a warning, they will consider factors
such as the nature and magnitude of the hazards associated
with the product, the expectations of consumers regard-

42.
43.
44.
45.

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. §2(c) (Am. L. Inst. 1998).
Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A (Am. L. Inst. 1965).
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. §2 (Am. L. Inst. 1998).
8 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 547 (1990); Hildy Bowbeer et al., Warning!
Failure to Read This Article May Be Hazardous to Your Failure to Warn Defense, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 439 (2000).
46. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 558-59 (Cal.
1991).
47. See, e.g., Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994); Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 926 n.4 (Minn. 1986);
Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (Ohio 1990).
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ing the product, the likelihood of injury, and the feasibility and beneficial effect of including a warning.48 Courts
will also consider the relationship to the plaintiff when
assessing duty.49 Some courts have held that only users or
consumers have standing to bring a strict liability failureto-warn claim.50 But other courts have upheld failure-towarn claims brought by governmental entities acting as
end-users, regulators, or parens patriae, where defendants
owed a duty to the general public to warn of a product’s
dangers.51 Some jurisdictions also allow failure-to-warn
claims to be filed by bystander plaintiffs who are injured
by a product when it is used by third parties.52
As with public nuisance claims, plaintiffs must show
that the defendant’s failure to warn caused actual harm,
and the substantial factor test is typically used to assess
causation where there are multiple causes contributing
to the harm.53 For negligence claims, plaintiffs must also
establish proximate causation—which, as noted above, is
closely tied to the question of whether harms were foreseeable. As such, there is considerable overlap between the
evidence required to demonstrate that the failure to warn
was unreasonable (insofar as harms were foreseeable) and
that the failure to warn was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s injury.
However, courts may also consider whether there were
any intervening factors that may counsel against imposing
liability—for example, some jurisdictions apply the learned
intermediary doctrine, which holds that a product manufacturer cannot be held liable for a failure to warn consumers of the risks of a product when it has provided the
necessary warnings to a “learned intermediary” who then
supplies the product to the consumer.54 Some courts also
recognize the sophisticated intermediary doctrine, under
48. See, e.g., Oxford v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 418, 432 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009).
49. See, e.g., Burton v. American Cyanamid, 334 F. Supp. 3d 949, 959 (E.D.
Wis. 2018).
50. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1108
(W.D. Wash. 2017).
51. See, e.g., State v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d 266, 289-90, 45 ELR 20191
(N.H. 2015); Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St. 3d 416, 425,
2002-Ohio-2480, ¶ 34, 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1147; Commonwealth v. Monsanto Co., 269 A.3d 623, 666 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2021).
52. See, e.g., Erie Ins. Co. v. W.M. Barr & Co., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 3d 1
(D.D.C. 2021); Bah v. Nordson Corp., No. 9-60, 2005 WL 1813023, at
*15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2005); LaPaglia v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Inc., 143
A.D.2d 173, 177 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261,
274-75 (N.Y. 1984). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts §388 (Am.
L. Inst. 1965) (legal duty to warn typically extends to all whom the supplier
or manufacturer “should expect to use the [product] . . . or to be endangered
by its probable use” and supplier should therefore give warning as “necessary
to make its use safe for them and those in the vicinity it is to be used”) (emphasis added); To whom should warnings be given?, Prod. Liab.: Design and
Mfg. Defects §10:7 (Lewis Bass & Thomas Redick et al. eds., 2022) (noting that “it has been held that a manufacturer or seller is liable for failure to
warn third persons who might be considered nonusers of the product, but
foreseeably might be subjected to danger”).
53. See, e.g., Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions,
CACI No. 1205, Strict Liability—Failure to Warn—Essential Factual Elements (2020 ed.).
54. This is typically applied in cases involving pharmaceuticals and medical devices, where doctors are the intermediaries. See, e.g., Vitanza v. Upjohn Co.,
778 A.2d 829 (Conn. 2001). But cf. Perez v. Wyeth Lab’ys Inc., 734 A.2d
1245, 1257 (N.J. 1999) (holding that the learned intermediary doctrine
does not apply to the direct marketing of drugs to consumers).
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which a manufacturer is not required to provide warnings
to an intermediary that has sufficiently in-depth knowledge of a product such that it actually knew or should have
known about the potential harm.55

B.

Assessing Causation Through the
Substantial Factor Test

Many jurisdictions apply the substantial factor test when
assessing whether a defendant was the factual and proximate cause of a plaintiffs’ injuries in a tort proceeding.56
This test is typically applied when there are two or more
causes that contributed to the injury. What exactly qualifies as a “substantial factor” will vary depending on the
jurisdiction, cause of action, and nature of factual claims
raised in the case.
The Supreme Court of California has established a relatively low threshold for the substantial factor test, holding:
The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one,
requiring only that the contribution of the individual
cause be more than negligible or theoretical. Thus, a force
that plays only an infinitesimal or theoretical part in
bringing about injury, damage, or loss is not a substantial
factor, but a very minor force that does cause harm is a
substantial factor. This rule honors the principle of comparative fault.57

The Supreme Court of California has also clarified that
the substantial factor standard subsumes the “but for” causation test in situations involving independent or concurrent causes of harm:
If the actor’s wrongful conduct operated concurrently with
other contemporaneous forces to produce the harm, it is
a substantial factor, and thus a legal cause, if the injury,
or its full extent, would not have occurred but for that
conduct. Conversely, if the injury would have occurred
even if the actor had not acted wrongfully, his or her conduct generally cannot be deemed a substantial factor in
the harm.58

Other states have adopted the substantial factor test
without providing detailed parameters for its application.
For example, the Supreme Court of Hawaii has held that
“[i]t is not necessary that [the defendant’s conduct] be the
whole cause or the only factor as under the ‘substantial
factor’ test a negligent party will not automatically escape
liability merely because other causes have contributed to
the plaintiff’s injury.”62 In Rhode Island, where a public
nuisance claim has been filed against fossil fuel producers by the state, the state supreme court has not articulated standards for applying the substantial factor test,
but did affirm a grant of summary judgment dismissing
a negligence action against a public utility based on the
determination that a single inoperable streetlight was not a
substantial factor in causing a vehicle to hit a pedestrian in
a poorly lit area.63
The substantial factor test is related to the requirement
to show proximate cause in a tort proceeding. In both contexts, courts are concerned with whether it is reasonable to
impose liability on a defendant based on its contribution
to the plaintiff’s injury. But whereas the proximate cause
inquiry typically focuses on the foreseeability of and proximity to harm, the substantial factor test focuses on the
scale of the contribution. Recognizing this relationship,
some courts treat the substantial factor test as an element
of proximate cause.64

C.

Limitations to Tort Liability

Several factors can preclude findings of causation and liability in public nuisance and failure-to-warn cases, some
of which are relevant to the tort lawsuits filed against fossil fuel companies. These include First Amendment limitations on the imposition of liability for political speech,
questions about whether government conduct is an intervening cause that breaks the chain of causation, and statelaw doctrines pertaining to the apportionment of liability
between multiple defendants.65 None of these issues should
necessarily preclude the plaintiffs from succeeding with
their tort claims in climate-related suits, but they could
complicate the causation analysis.

California courts have applied this substantial factor test to
various torts, including negligence,59 public nuisance, 60 and
failure-to-warn claims.61

55.
56.
57.
58.

See, e.g., Webb v. Special Elec. Co., 370 P.3d 1022, 1035 (Cal. 2016).
3 American Law of Torts §11:2 (Stuart Speiser et al. eds., 2022).
Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co., 21 Cal. 4th 71, 72 (Cal. 1999).
In re Ethan C., 279 P.3d 1052, 1071 (Cal. 2012). See also Viner v. Sweet,
70 P.3d 1046, 1051 (Cal. 2003) (if “two forces are actively operating . . .
and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor’s
negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about”).
59. Ethan C., 279 P.3d at 1071.
60. See, e.g., City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 491 F. Supp.
3d 610, 677 (N.D. Cal. 2020); People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 17
Cal. App. 5th 51 (2017).
61. See, e.g., Trejo v. Johnson & Johnson, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127, 150 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2017); Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions,
supra note 53.
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62. McKenna v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 558 P.2d 1018, 1022
(Haw. 1977).
63. Laprocina v. Lourie, 250 A.3d 1281, 1289 (R.I. 2021).
64. See, e.g., ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th at 104.
65. Another potential limitation on tort liability is the municipal cost recovery
doctrine, which limits the ability of local governments to recover from tortfeasors in some contexts. This doctrine does not affect the analysis of causation, so we do not discuss it here. However, it has factored into public nuisance lawsuits involving other types of products. See, e.g., City of Chicago
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1144 (Ill. 2004) (holding that
municipal cost recovery doctrine barred recovery in a public nuisance case
against handgun manufacturers); In re Opioid Litig., No. 400000/2017,
2018 WL 3115102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18, 2018) (holding that municipal
cost recovery doctrine was not applicable in public nuisance case against
opioid manufacturers); In re JUUL Labs, Inc., Mktg., Sales Prac. & Prods.
Liab. Litig., 497 F. Supp. 3d 552, 644-45 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (same).
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1.	

Limitations on Tort Liability for Political Speech

The First Amendment imposes limits on the permissible
scope of tort liability. 66 In most cases, individuals and
corporations cannot be held liable for political speech,
which includes “interactive communication concerning
political change,”67 and “discussion of public issues and
debate on the qualifications of candidates.”68 Even false
and misleading political speech may be protected under
the First Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that there is
“no constitutional value in false statements of fact,” and
that “[n]either the intentional lie nor the careless error
materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.”69 However, because sanctioning false speech “may lead to intolerable censorship . . . [t]he First Amendment requires that
we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that
matters.”70 There are narrow circumstances where liability
may arise from false political speech—for example, where
a publisher makes a libelous statement about a public figure
with actual malice—that is, knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.71
But generally speaking, political speech receives the highest level of protection.72
The First Amendment does not provide the same
level of protection for commercial speech, including
advertisements,73 expressions concerning commercial
transactions,74 and other “expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”75 Most
notably, there is no immunity for false or misleading commercial speech.76 Thus, companies can be held liable for
66. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also David
S. Han, Managing Constitutional Boundaries in Speech-Tort Jurisprudence,
69 DePaul L. Rev. 495 (2020) (discussing First Amendment issues in
the context of “speech tort” cases, and recommending a pragmatic, openended, and contextualized approach to balancing competing interests in
these cases).
67. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988).
68. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). See also New York Times Co., 376
U.S. at 269 (describing political speech as the “interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people”).
69. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (citing New York
Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270).
70. Id. at 341.
71. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 280. In cases where a private defendant
has made a libelous or defamatory statement, plaintiffs can recover damages
based on a showing of negligence rather than actual malice. Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 347. See also Han, supra note 66, at 513-14. The actual malice standard
has been applied to other tort claims that resemble defamation claims. See,
e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1967); Hustler v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Inv.’s
Servs., 175 F.3d 848, 856-58 (10th Cir. 1999); Unelko Corp. v. Rooney,
912 F.2d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 1990).
72. Meyer, 486 U.S. 414; Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
73. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 748
(1976).
74. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983); Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
75. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 561 (1980). See also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979).
76. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 557 (“For commercial speech
to come within the First Amendment, it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading.”). See also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709,
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deceptive advertising. Granted, not all consumer-facing
communications automatically qualify as commercial
speech.77 The speaker’s intent matters: public communications that are “clearly intended to promote sales” qualify as
commercial speech, but “institutional and informational
messages” may be protected under the First Amendment.78
Some of the defendants in the fossil fuel disinformation
cases have asserted that their communications qualify as
“government petitions” or “political speech” that should
be shielded from liability under the First Amendment.79
In at least one case, defendants have explicitly invoked
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which shields government
petitions from civil liability.80 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine originally developed in antitrust litigation, but has
since been applied to other types of lawsuits, including
tort cases.81
When applying this doctrine, the Supreme Court has
recognized a distinction between political conduct with a
commercial impact and conduct that is fundamentally commercial but that may have an incidental political impact.
Noerr-Pennington does not provide immunity for commercial speech simply because it has a political impact.82 However, a “publicity campaign directed at the general public,
seeking legislative or executive action, enjoys antitrust
immunity even when the campaign employs unethical and
deceptive methods.”83 There is a “sham petition” exception: Noerr-Pennington does not apply to reckless or intentional fraudulent statements made during the course of an
administrative or judicial proceeding,84 but this exception
does not extend to misrepresentations seeking to influence
legislative or executive action.85

77.

78.
79.
80.
81.

82.

83.
84.
85.

723 (2012); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 762 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Kasky v. Nike, Inc.,
45 P.3d 243, 251 (Cal. 2002), as modified (May 22, 2002).
For further discussion of what qualifies as “commercial speech,” see C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 Ind. L.J. 981
(2009); Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment:
Scientific Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 Vand.
L. Rev. 1433 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 372 (1979/1980).
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563.
See, e.g., Appellants’ Brief, Exxon Mobil v. Commonwealth, No. 2021-P0860 (Mass. App. Ct. filed Nov. 8, 2021).
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss ¶ 3, Oakland v. BP, No. 3:17-cv-6011WHA (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 19, 2019).
See, e.g., Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 128-29 (3d
Cir. 1999); IGEN Int’l, Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 335 F.3d 303,
312 (4th Cir. 2003); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000);
Video Int’l Prods., Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Commc’ns, Inc., 858 F.2d
1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 938-39,
2 ELR 20698 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 507
(1988) (discussing efforts by members of the National Fire Protection Association to exclude a product from the association’s National Electrical Code,
which was subsequently adopted by state and local governments: “Although
one could reason backwards from the legislative impact of the Code to the
conclusion that the conduct at issue here is ‘political,’ we think that, given
the context and nature of the conduct, it can more aptly be characterized as
commercial activity with a political impact”).
Id. at 499-500.
See, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972).
See Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499-500. See also Mercatus Grp., LLC v. Lake
Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2011) (outlining considerations to
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The law is not yet settled regarding the applicability of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine or the scope of First
Amendment protections for deliberately false speech.86 The
Supreme Court decisions interpreting Noerr-Pennington
all involve antitrust litigation, and it is possible that the
standards will shift as the doctrine is expanded into other
areas of law. There are also still inconsistencies in how
lower courts apply the doctrine. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit, for example,
has held that Noerr-Pennington does not protect deliberately false or misleading statements in any context,87 but
other circuits have held that the fraud exception is limited
to administrative adjudications.88
Some legal scholars have argued that courts have
expanded Noerr-Pennington immunity beyond its original justifications, and have made the case for expanding
the fraud exception or abolishing the doctrine altogether.89
Legal scholars have also argued, more generally, that the
First Amendment should not be interpreted as providing immunity for deliberate public deception schemes or
“fraud on the public.”90 But unless and until the Supreme
Court revisits this issue, it appears that most courts will
continue to recognize broad immunity for government
petitions and other noncommercial speech, even where the
speech is deliberately false and misleading.91
Due to the breadth of First Amendment protections for
political speech, it is unlikely that the plaintiffs in the fossil
fuel disinformation cases would be able to establish liability or recover damages based on the defendants’ lobbying
activities. Recognizing this, the plaintiffs have focused on
the defendants’ public-facing communications, advertisements, and statements to investors as the source of the
nuisance.92 The defendants have maintained that these
communications also qualify as protected political speech,
but at least one reviewing court has already rejected this
argument. Specifically, in Commonwealth v. Exxon Mobil,
the trial court denied Exxon’s motion to dismiss because
the court determined that Exxon’s statements to investors
and its “greenwashing” statements to the public did not

86.
87.

88.

89.

90.
91.
92.

weigh when drawing the line between legislative and adjudicative proceedings for Noerr-Pennington purposes).
See Erin Chemerinsky, False Speech and the First Amendment, 71 Okla. L.
Rev. 1 (2018).
See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1123 (D.C.
Cir. 2009); Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n, 48
F.3d 1260, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
See Aaron R. Wegrzyn, Seventh Circuit Nixes Sherman Act Claims Based
on the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and Implied Antitrust Immunity, Foley
& Lardner LLP (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/
publications/2020/03/seventh-circuit-nixes-sherman-act-claims.
See, e.g., Tim Wu, Antitrust and Corruption: Overruling Noerr, Knight
First Amend. Inst. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/
antitrust-and-corruption-overruling-noerr; Karen Roche, Deference or Destruction? Reining in the Noerr-Pennington and State Action Doctrines, 45
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1295 (2013).
Henricksen, supra note 3.
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that the
Stolen Valor Act, which criminalized false statements about military decorations or medals, violated the First Amendment).
Some plaintiffs have explicitly stated that they are not seeking to recover
damages on the basis of lobbying efforts. See, e.g., Oakland Am. Complaint,
supra note 12, ¶ 11; San Francisco Am. Complaint, supra note 12, ¶ 11.
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qualify as protected government petitions, even though
those statements had the potential to influence lawmakers.93
This focus on commercial speech may affect the causation analysis in these cases by limiting the types of arguments and evidence that can be used to demonstrate the
effect of fossil fuel disinformation campaigns. Plaintiffs
will likely need to focus on the effects of advertisements
and consumer-facing communications, and might not be
able to predicate causation on evidence of fossil fuel companies’ lobbying activities.94 However, it is possible that evidence of defendants’ government-facing communications
could be brought into the cases if defendants raise government action or inaction as a defense or superseding cause,
as discussed below.

2.	

Government Conduct as a Superseding Cause
of Plaintiffs’ Injuries

The defendants in the fossil fuel disinformation cases may
argue that government decisions about climate policy and
greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation are a superseding cause
of the plaintiffs’ injuries. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts defines a “superseding cause” as “an act of a third
person or other force which by its intervention prevents
the actor from being liable for harm to another which his
antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing
about.”95 The Restatement also recognizes that there may
be an “intervening force” (i.e., a factor that “actively operates in producing harm to another after the actor’s negligent act or omission has been committed”) that does not
qualify as a superseding cause that breaks the chain of
liability.96 It outlines a number of considerations that are
relevant to determining whether an intervening force is a
superseding cause:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm
different in kind from that which would otherwise
have resulted from the actor’s negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences
thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary
rather than normal in view of the circumstances
existing at the time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating
independently of any situation created by the actor’s
negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal
result of such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force
is due to a third person’s act or to his failure to act;
93. Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendant’s Special Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 1, 5, Commonwealth v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No.1984CV03333 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 22, 2021). See also
Amanda Shanor & Sarah E. Light, Greenwashing and the First Amendment,
Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022) (arguing that greenwashing should not
receive protection under the First Amendment).
94. See Part III, for a more detailed discussion of what evidence could be used
to demonstrate causation.
95. Restatement (Second) of Torts §440 (Am. L. Inst. 1965).
96. Id. §441.
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(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an
act of a third person which is wrongful toward the
other and as such subjects the third person to liability to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third
person which sets the intervening force in motion.97
Consistent with the Restatement definition, a superseding
cause is a defense to negligence, and courts have also recognized that “intervening causes” may break the chain of
causation in public nuisance suits, particularly where these
intervening causes are unforeseeable,98 or the result of criminal activity by third parties.99
In the fossil fuel disinformation cases, the government’s
failure to adequately control GHG emissions and its affirmative policies enabling the continued production and
use of fossil fuels could be offered as intervening causes
contributing to the plaintiffs’ injuries. However, there is
ample evidence that the government’s policy response was
a foreseeable and intended consequence of the defendants’
disinformation efforts. Thus, the factors outlined above,
particularly factor (c), would weigh against a determination that government conduct qualifies as a “superseding
cause” limiting the liability of fossil fuel defendants.
However, this argument may undermine the plaintiffs’
characterization of the defendants’ communications as
“commercial speech,” since courts may view evidence of
intent to affect government policy as indicative of political speech.100 Plaintiffs may find it helpful to distinguish
between commercial speech upon which liability may be
based and government-oriented speech that is not the basis
for liability, but that nonetheless rebuts the notion of government policy being a superseding cause. In some tobacco
cases, for example, plaintiffs have presented evidence of
government-facing disinformation by tobacco-industry
defendants in order to rebut defendants’ argument that
government policies, rather than defendants’ actions, were
the cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries.101
Treating governmental policies or inaction as a superseding cause would also create an excessively broad exception
to tort liability. In Part II, we discuss litigation involving
tobacco, lead paint, and opioids. In these cases, one could
argue that government failures to adequately regulate the
harmful products (or affirmative policies such as Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) authorizations and subsidies)
contributed to the plaintiffs’ injuries. If this had been a

97. Id. §442. See also §447 (recognizing that an intervening act is not a superseding cause of harm if it is foreseeable to the defendant).
98. See, e.g., James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2003). Cf. Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 742 P.2d 377,
388 (Haw. 1987) (holding that a person’s “independent acts could not
have superseded or excused the defendants’ negligence if such acts were
reasonably foreseeable”).
99. See, e.g., People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192,
201 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
100. See, e.g., Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 914 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that
Noerr-Pennington immunity extends to the consequences of government
acts that result from immunized petitioning).
101. Interview with Robert Proctor, Expert Witness in Tobacco Litigation (Nov.
30, 2021).
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valid defense, it would have been impossible for plaintiffs
to pursue their tort claims. It is more logical for courts to
address the effect of government policies through the lens
of legislative displacement and preemption—doctrines
that are relevant to climate change litigation, but outside
the scope of this Article.102

3.	

Apportioning Liability Among
Multiple Defendants

In tort cases involving multiple defendants, questions inevitably arise regarding the apportionment of liability. California and other states have adopted a market-share theory
of liability, which apportions liability among manufacturers according to their share of the market for the product
giving rise to the plaintiff’s injury. Under this theory, a
plaintiff can potentially recover costs from manufacturers
for an injury caused by their product, even if it cannot pinpoint exactly which defendant’s product is responsible for
its injury.103
Courts have held that it makes sense to apply the market-share theory of liability for products that are perfectly
fungible (i.e., where each unit of the product is equally
harmful).104 The same rationale could justify the imposition of market-share liability on the basis of GHG emissions from fossil fuel products, since those emissions can be
expressed in terms of their carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent.105 For this reason, plaintiffs’ pleadings have frequently
characterized the “market share” of each defendant on the
basis of the GHG emissions caused by the fossil fuels each
defendant has historically produced.106
Some state courts have rejected or significantly limited
the application of the market-share theory, particularly
where products are not perfectly fungible (e.g., lead paint).107
In those jurisdictions, courts may still hold defendants
liable for contributing to an injury that is caused by multiple parties, where the defendant’s separate conduct was a

102. For more on the topic of displacement and preemption in climate nuisance
suits, see Lin & Burger, supra note 5; Jonathan Adler, Displacement and
Preemption of Climate Nuisance Claims, 17 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 217 (2022).
103. Sindell v. Abbott Lab’ys, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 589 (Cal. 1980); Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989).
104. Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share
Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 151 (2004).
105. One could argue that each unit of CO2 equivalent is roughly equivalent
insofar as each unit causes approximately the same level of harm. However, GHG emissions expressed in CO2 equivalent may not be perfectly
fungible because the timing of the emission can influence the amount of
harm caused. For example, a unit of CO2 emitted recently may be viewed
as having caused less damage than a unit of CO2 emitted decades ago, since
a time period of several decades is required for CO2 to cause the bulk of
its warming effect. On the other hand, one could argue that more recent
emissions will cause more damage than earlier emissions because the scale of
damage caused by global warming is not necessarily linear, and more recent
emissions may push us toward a set of unavailable tipping points that cause
greater damage.
106. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 7, City of Richmond v. Chevron Corp., No. C1800055 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 22, 2018); Complaint ¶ 7, County of
Marin v. Chevron Corp., No. CIV1702586 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 17,
2017).
107. See, e.g., Gorman v. Abbott Lab’ys, 599 A.2d 1364, 1364 (R.I. 1991); Skipworth by Williams v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 690 A.2d 169, 172 (Pa. 1997).
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substantial cause of the plaintiff’s injury.108 Plaintiffs may
also be able to proceed with an alternative theory of collective liability, such as enterprise liability, which is based on
wrongdoing by an industry viewed as a single enterprise, or
concert of action (or “concerted action”), which may apply
where multiple parties are engaged in a common plan or
scheme to commit a tort.109 Such theories are potentially
applicable to the fossil fuel lawsuits in light of evidence that
the defendants coordinated with each other to spread disinformation and delay action on climate change.110

II.

Evidentiary Approaches in Other
Public Deception Lawsuits

Beyond fossil fuel disinformation litigation, other legal
contexts have featured plaintiffs pursuing tort and consumer protection claims against companies for misleading
the public about the risks associated with their products.
These cases provide valuable insights on the types of factual evidence and legal arguments that can be used to
demonstrate a causal nexus between public deception and
physical harm resulting from a dangerous product.
Some of the closest analogues to the fossil fuel disinformation cases are public nuisance and consumer protection lawsuits involving false and misleading advertisements
for tobacco, lead paint, and opioids. The plaintiffs in these
cases—primarily governments and health insurers—have
focused on public deception as the source of the nuisance
to distinguish their arguments from traditional product liability claims.111 This strategy is not bulletproof, but has pro108. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lynch v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. CIV.A. 99-5226, 2005
WL 1331196, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 3, 2005) (holding that a public
nuisance claim could proceed against lead paint manufactures “where it is
claimed that each of the defendants through their own separate actions or
conduct was a substantial cause of the massive public nuisance and harms
and/or injuries resulting therefrom”).
109. See, e.g., City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 190 A.D.2d 173, 17778 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993):
[I]f manufacturers cooperate to conceal product risk, and if the
concealed risk subsequently causes injury, justice demands a remedy. The concert of action theory rests upon this equity to justify
joint and several liability against any manufacturer that substantially contributes to an injury by coordinating activity with other
manufacturers to conceal information.
110. See, e.g., Christophe Bonneuil et al., Early Warnings and Emerging Accountability: Total’s Responses to Global Warming, 1971-2021, 71 Glob. Env’t
Change 102386 (2021); Benjamin Franta, Early Oil Industry Disinformation on Global Warming, 30 Env’t Pol. 663 (2021).
111. Prior to the tobacco, lead paint, and opioid cases, courts had rejected public
nuisance claims that were comparable to strict liability claims of product
defect. For example, in the 1980s, municipalities and schools unsuccessfully
pursued public nuisance claims against asbestos manufacturers to recover
the costs of removing asbestos from their facilities. Most of these cases were
dismissed because courts held that the doctrine of public nuisance was not
an appropriate vehicle for a traditional products liability action. See, e.g.,
City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876, 882 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994) (the “City has essentially pleaded a products liability action,
not a nuisance action”); Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d
513, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (the case was “clearly a products liability
action”); Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15 of Williams Cnty., State of North
Dakota v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting
nuisance claim as this “would give rise to a cause of action . . . regardless of
the defendant’s degree of culpability or the availability of other traditional
tort law theories of recovery”).
		 Several courts also asserted that a nuisance claim could not succeed because defendants did not have effective control over the product when the

12-2022

duced a number of major settlements with the defendant
companies, as well as a handful of courtroom victories.
Causation has been a major point of contention in these
cases. To prove that the defendants’ false and misleading
statements caused harm, plaintiffs must typically provide
some evidence that the statements affected public perception and/or conduct. This is similar to the requirement to
demonstrate reliance in a fraud action—however, plaintiffs
do not necessarily need to present evidence of individual
reliance on specific false statements in order to prevail on
a public nuisance claim. Rather, courts may infer public
reliance and other aspects of causation using multiple lines
of evidence, including information about the scope and
magnitude of the deceptive communications, the amount
of money spent on these communications, the targeting of
specific populations, internal assessments of the efficacy of
the communications, acknowledgements of intended reliance made by defendants and their agents in depositions,
expert testimony on the effects of disinformation, public
polling data, and more.112
Granted, even with robust evidence of causation, plaintiffs might not prevail on public nuisance claims predicated on public deception for other reasons. Some courts
still view these claims as an unreasonable expansion of the
doctrine of public nuisance.113 Courts have also dismissed
these cases in jurisdictions that limit nuisance liability
to situations where the defendant has direct control over
a product at the time it causes harm.114 But there are still
many states where public nuisance claims predicated on
public deception have been accepted by courts, or where
the issue has not been addressed or resolved.115
This section focuses on the tobacco, lead paint, and
opioid cases due to the clear parallels with the fossil fuel
disinformation cases. It focuses on public nuisance claims,
but also discusses strategies deployed in consumer protecnuisance was created. See, e.g., Detroit Bd. of Educ., 493 N.W.2d 513 (holding that a nuisance claim would ultimately fail because defendants lacked
control over the nuisance at the time of the injury); City of Manchester v.
National Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 646, 656 (D.R.I. 1986) (finding that
defendants “no longer had the power to abate the nuisance” after manufacture and sale, and thus “a basic element of the tort of nuisance is absent”);
U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915 (holding that nuisance claim could not
succeed because defendant was not in control of the product at the time the
alleged nuisance was created).
112. It is reasonable and often necessary for courts to rely on logical inferences
when evaluating causation in tort cases. See Elisabeth Lloyd & Theodore
Shepherd, Climate Change Attribution and Legal Contexts: Evidence and the
Role of Storylines, 167 Climatic Change 28 (2021) (explaining the scientific and legal legitimacy of using deductive reasoning to proceed from the
general to the specific).
113. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hunter v. Johnson & Johnson, 2021 OK 54, ¶ 8, 499
P.3d 719 (Okla. Nov. 9, 2021).
114. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 455, 38 ELR 20155
(R.I. 2008).
115. See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d
313, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006):
Liability for nuisance [in California] does not hinge on whether
the defendant owns, possesses or controls the property, nor on
whether he is in a position to abate the nuisance; the critical question is whether the defendant created or assisted in the creation of
the nuisance. While production of a defective product alone does
not constitute a nuisance, a product manufacturer’s more egregious
conduct—such as promotion of a product with knowledge of the
hazard that such use would create—may suffice.
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tion, antitrust, and racketeering lawsuits involving those
products due to the significant overlap in claims and evidentiary strategies. The section concludes by highlighting
some additional considerations for failure-to-warn claims,
since this cause of action has not featured as prominently
in tobacco, lead paint, and opioid litigation.

A.

Public Nuisance and Related Claims

1.	Tobacco
In the 1990s, 40 state governments and various municipalities, health care insurers, and labor union insurers
filed a series of lawsuits against tobacco companies, seeking compensation for expenses incurred as a result of the
public health crisis created by tobacco products. Public
nuisance was one of several legal theories pursued in these
cost recovery cases; plaintiffs also alleged other torts and
violations of consumer protection and antitrust statutes.116
The plaintiffs argued that the defendants had created a
nuisance and violated other laws by intentionally spreading
disinformation and misleading the public about the health
effects of tobacco products, thus distinguishing their
claims from previous product liability lawsuits that had not
been successful.117 This legal strategy was made possible by
new evidence of the tobacco industry’s efforts to conceal
and misrepresent tobacco-related health concerns.118 Plaintiffs used the process of legal discovery to amass millions of
internal corporate documents demonstrating the companies’ clear intent to mislead the public.119
In 1998, the attorneys general of 52 states and territories
entered into a $246 billion settlement agreement with four
of the largest tobacco companies, which required the companies to make annual payments to the states, regulated
tobacco advertising and communications, dissolved some
industry trade associations, and in return protected the
companies from certain types of legal actions.120 Because of
the settlement, courts did not have an opportunity to rule
on the merits of the public nuisance claims or other causes
of action.121 But it was clear that the evidence compiled by
116. Albert C. Lin, Dodging Public Nuisance, 11 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 489 (2020);
Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U.
Cincinnati L. Rev. 741, 753 (2003).
117. See, e.g., Complaint, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co., No.
94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct. filed May 23, 1994). See also Gifford, supra note
116 (discussing unsuccessful product liability lawsuits filed against tobacco manufacturers).
118. Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota Tobacco Litigation, 25 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 477 (1999); Climate
Accountability Institute & Union of Concerned Scientists, Establishing Accountability for Climate Change Damages: Lessons
From Tobacco Control—Summary of the Workshop on Climate Accountability, Public Opinion, and Legal Strategies (2012). See also
Richard D. Hurt et al., Open Doorway to Truth: Legacy of the Minnesota
Tobacco Trial, 84 Mayo Clinic Proc. 446 (2009).
119. Ciresi et al., supra note 118.
120. National Association of Attorneys General, The Master Settlement Agreement, https://www.naag.org/our-work/naag-center-for-tobacco-and-publichealth/the-master-settlement-agreement/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2022).
121. There is at least one case where a court dismissed a state public nuisance
claim against a tobacco company due to a failure to plead essential allega-
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plaintiffs of intentional misrepresentation and concealment was critical to achieving the settlement.
The plaintiffs’ evidentiary strategy in these cases was
roughly the same regardless of the cause of action. Plaintiffs sought to establish causation by documenting the overall effect of the defendants’ disinformation campaigns on
the public, rather than demonstrating individual reliance
on specific claims made by the defendants. This approach
reflected the fact that plaintiffs were seeking to recover
damages based on the cost of the public health response
as opposed to individual injuries. They presented multiple
lines of evidence indicating that the defendants’ misleading advertisements had in fact encouraged the uptake and
continued use of tobacco products. Some of this evidence
was compiled from external sources.
For example, the state of Oklahoma pointed out that
more than 3,000 children and teenagers began smoking
every day as a result of tobacco company advertisements,
based on a government survey of smokers.122 The plaintiffs
also uncovered internal corporate communications touting
the success of their advertising and public relations campaigns. The state of Mississippi described how the industry had “congratulated itself on a brilliantly conceived and
executed strategy to create doubt about the charge that
cigarette smoking is deleterious to health without actually
denying it,” citing a 1962 memo in which industry actors
discussed how they had successfully handled the “emergency” created by knowledge of the carcinogenic effects of
their product.123 Health insurers in California highlighted a
confidential document called the “Forward Look Report,”
which described how tobacco companies’ efforts to garner
favorable press were succeeding, as well as an internal public relations report that discussed the progress that tobacco
companies had made in combatting narratives about the
harmful effects of their products.124
The plaintiffs also cited evidence of other ways in which
the defendants’ disinformation campaigns had affected
public discourse and media coverage related to tobacco. For
example, the state of Mississippi pointed out that tobacco
companies had “caused the cancellation of press conferences [on the harmful effects of tobacco] . . . , actively and
wrongfully suppressed the publication of reports concerning the dangers presented by cigarette smoking, attacked
research linking smoking to disease, and threatened [scientific researchers].”125

tions required by statute. Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d
956, 973 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (“the State failed to plead that Defendants improperly used their own property, or that the State itself has been injured in
its use or employment of its property”).
122. State of Oklahoma’s Memorandum in Opposition to Certain Defendants’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Concerning Plaintiffs’ Public Nuisance Claim at 7, State v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. CJ-96-1499
(Okla. Dist. Ct. filed June 29, 1998).
123. Id. ¶ 56.
124. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 61 & 65, Central Coast Tr. Fund v. Philip Morris,
No. 998208 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 30, 1998); Complaint ¶¶ 61 & 65,
Joint Benefit Tr. v. Philip Morris, No. 799495-5 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed June
15, 1998).
125. Complaint ¶ 47, Moore ex rel. State v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429
(Miss. Ch. Ct. filed May 23, 1994).
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Although none of these cases reached final adjudication on the merits, the lawsuit filed by the state of Minnesota and Blue Cross (a health maintenance organization,
or HMO)—which involved tort, consumer protection,
antitrust, and equitable claims—did go to trial, and the
Minnesota state courts issued several rulings on motions to
dismiss and for summary judgment that addressed issues
related to causation.126 For their tort claim, the plaintiffs
did not allege public nuisance, but rather that the defendants had “assumed a special responsibility and duty to
render services for the protection of the public health and a
duty to those who advance and protect the public health,”
through public reassurances and representations related to
public health and tobacco use.127
The defendants sought to have the case dismissed on the
grounds that both the state and the HMO plaintiff (Blue
Cross) had no basis for filing a direct action, as opposed to
a subrogation claim.128 They also argued that Blue Cross
lacked standing to sue because it had “passed through” its
health care expenditures to subscribers through increased
premiums.129 The district court rejected these arguments,
finding that both plaintiffs had direct causes of action
against the defendants, that they had successfully pled the
elements of their tort claim as well as the other statutory
claims, and that Blue Cross did have standing to sue based
on economic injury.130
The defendants appealed the portion of the ruling denying their motion to dismiss Blue Cross’ claims. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed most aspects of the district
court ruling, finding that Blue Cross had standing to bring
its consumer protection, antitrust, and equitable claims.131
However, it held that Blue Cross lacked standing with
respect to its tort claim because its injury was “too remote”
and “appear[ed] to derive from injuries to its consumers,
the smokers.”132
The defendants later filed a motion for summary judgment in which they disputed causation on the grounds
that the plaintiffs were required to show individual reliance on specific fraudulent statements, and that plaintiffs
could not establish causation based on the defendants’
communications to the government (which they characterized as “government petitions” protected by the First
Amendment).133 The defendants also argued that the state
of Minnesota was precluded from maintaining a direct
126. See State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. 1994); Gary L. Wilson & Jason A. Gillmer, Minnesota’s Tobacco
Case: Recovering Damages Without Individual Proof of Reliance Under Minnesota’s Consumer Protection Statutes, 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 569 (1999).
127. Complaint ¶ 85, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-948565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. undated).
128. Wilson & Gillmer, supra note 126, at 572.
129. State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1995 WL
1937124, at *2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 19, 1995).
130. Id. at *5.
131. State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996).
132. Id. at 495.
133. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Consolidated Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Based on Plaintiffs’ Inability to Prove Causation or
Damages and Based on Defendants’ Right to Petition Government at 1-3,
State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. Oct. 21, 1997).
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tort claim because, like Blue Cross, the state’s injury was
“derivative of injuries to third parties” and “too remote”
from the defendants’ conduct.134 The Minnesota District
Court rejected all these arguments.
On the issue of derivative injury and tort liability, the
court held that the state of Minnesota was situated differently than Blue Cross, because it was a public health
authority (as opposed to a private insurer), and it was
only “one step” removed from the defendants’ conduct
(“from the tobacco industry to the individual smokers to
Minnesota”).135 Thus, the court found that the state’s injury
was not too remote as a matter of law. It also noted that
the relief sought was “independent from that available to
individual smokers,” and thus a direct action was appropriate.136 The court ultimately held that factual and proximate
causation were issues of fact to be determined by the jury
after presentation of evidence.137
The court issued a separate order ruling that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence of causation to survive a motion for summary judgment.138 On the issue of
whether reliance must be proven, the court characterized
the plaintiffs’ claims as “those for which the legislature
has expanded the connection between conduct and injury
necessary to permit suit,” and noted that the Minnesota
consumer fraud statutes, for example, “are more liberal
than common law fraud in that proof of reliance is not
required.”139 The court did not draw a distinction between
the plaintiffs’ tort and statutory claims, and it allowed all
claims to proceed to trial—thus, it did not find that individual reliance was a required element for the tort claim.
In subsequent orders, the court stated that the conduct
of individual smokers was largely irrelevant to the issues
raised in the case,140 and that the conduct of smokers was
not a defense to any violations of the law by defendants.141
The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that
the plaintiffs could not establish causation based on misrepresentations or concealment made to legislators because
these qualified as “government petitions” protected by the
First Amendment. The court held that the issue whether
134. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Consolidated Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs’ Nonstatutory
Claims (Counts One, Eight, and Nine) at 1, State ex rel. Humphrey v.
Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 21, 1997).
135. Order Denying Defendants’ Consolidated Motion for Summary Judgment
Against Plaintiffs’ Nonstatutory Claims (Counts 1, 8, and 9), State ex rel.
Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at 2-3 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 1998).
136. Id. at 3.
137. Id. at 2.
138. Order Denying Defendants’ Consolidated Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Based on Plaintiffs’ Inability to Prove Causation or Damages and
Based on Defendants’ Right to Petition the Government, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 19,
1998).
139. Id. at 7.
140. Wilson & Gillmer, supra note 126, at 575. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses Based Upon Conduct of Individual Smokers,
State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at 3
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 27, 1998).
141. Wilson & Gillmer, supra note 126, at 575. Transcript of Proceedings at
15643-44, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565
(Minn. Dist. Ct. May 6, 1998).
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such misrepresentations or concealment had occurred was a
question of fact for the jury, and that such communications
were not necessarily protected under the First Amendment
as a matter of law.142
In its order denying summary judgment, the court noted
that the plaintiffs had compiled an “exhaustive” factual
record that included evidence that the defendant companies had intentionally misled the public about the risks of
smoking, targeted vulnerable groups including youth with
their communications, intended for these communications
to be relied upon, and acknowledged the effectiveness of
these communications in the industry’s own internal documents.143 This evidence was compiled from a combination
of documentary evidence (including internal corporate
communications) and expert testimony.
For example, plaintiffs enlisted a behavioral scientist
who testified that tobacco company advertisements made
smoking a “functional and rewarding behavior to some
adolescents,” and that the industry’s targeting of youth had
been a “substantial contributing factor” in causing young
people to begin smoking.144 Thus, through multiple lines of
evidence, the plaintiffs showed that the industry’s actions
were deceptive, caused consumers to start or continue
smoking, and substantially contributed to the costs borne
by the state and health insurers. The case settled after the
close of evidence and before the jury had an opportunity
to render findings, but the outcome suggests that the plaintiffs’ narrative and evidentiary strategy was effective.
The U.S. Department of Justice relied on similar evidence in obtaining a verdict against tobacco companies
in United States v. Philip Morris Inc.145 In 2006, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia issued a landmark decision finding that tobacco companies had violated
RICO by engaging in a conspiracy to deceive the American
public about the health effects of smoking.146 Although this
was a racketeering case, it provides insight on how courts
may evaluate the effect of false and misleading statements
on public perception in other contexts.
When addressing causation, the U.S. government
argued that proof of individual reliance was not required
because courts could “find reliance based on circumstantial evidence, reasonable inferences, expert testimony, and

various other types of evidence.”147 To establish a reasonable
inference of causation, the government provided (1) evidence that the defendants intended consumers to rely on
the industry’s messaging (e.g., by spending large amounts
of money on messaging campaigns and employing advertising agencies and public relations firms to refine their
messaging); (2) expert testimony that consumers relied on
tobacco messaging; (3) defendants’ admissions of reliance
in depositions and other proceedings; and (4) examples of
industry marketing to youth.148 The U.S. government also
cited other cases holding that courts may infer defendants’
profits were causally related to deceptive or false statements
when those statements were made intentionally.149
In a nearly 1,700-page opinion, U.S. District Court
Judge Gladys Kessler found for the United States on nearly
all issues presented. The court found defendants had falsely
denied the adverse health effects of smoking and that nicotine and smoking are addictive, manipulated cigarette
design and composition in order to assure nicotine delivery sufficient to create and sustain addiction, falsely represented light and low-tar cigarettes as less harmful than “full
flavor” cigarettes, falsely denied the industry had marketed
to youth, falsely denied that environmental tobacco smoke
(secondhand smoke) causes disease, and suppressed documents, information, and research.150 The court also spent
considerable time discussing how the industry had weaponized and selectively funded scientific research in order
to distract from the central truths of tobacco, create false
controversy, and cultivate public trust, and how the industry’s research activities and funding were often directed by
the industry’s lawyers.151
The court held that Noerr-Pennington, and the First
Amendment more broadly, did not protect the defendants’
false and misleading public statements, because “NoerrPennington protects only those . . . statements made in the
course of petitioning the legislature; it does not immunize
statements made with the purpose of influencing smokers, potential smokers, and the general public.”152 The court
found that the industry acted with the specific intent to
deceive and that its statements were material.153 The court
also rejected the industry’s argument that its statements
were merely “opinions” held in good faith, since they
demonstrably contradicted the industry’s internal understanding and because the falsity of the industry’s state-

142. Order Denying Defendants’ Consolidated Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Based on Plaintiffs’ Inability to Prove Causation or Damages and
Based on Defendants’ Right to Petition the Government at 7, State ex rel.
Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 19,
1998).
143. Id. at 4-6. See also Wilson & Gillmer, supra note 126, at 608-24.
144. Order Denying Defendants’ Consolidated Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Based on Plaintiffs’ Inability to Prove Causation or Damages and
Based on Defendants’ Right to Petition the Government at 6, State ex rel.
Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb.
19, 1998); Wilson & Gillmer, supra note 126, at 621 (citing Expert Report
of Dr. Cheryl L. Perry, Ph.D., at 7, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris
Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. undated)).
145. 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 566 F.3d
1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and order clarified, 778 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C.
2011).
146. Id.

147. United States’ Final Proposed Conclusions of Law (Vol. One) at 146, United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006)
(No. 1:99-cv-02496-GK). The U.S. government also argued that reliance
was not required as a general matter for disgorgement, because the purpose
of disgorgement is not to compensate the injured party, but to deprive a
wrongdoer of unjust enrichment and to deter future similar behavior. Id. at
143-46.
148. Id. at 146-68.
149. Id.
150. See Final Amended Opinion at 1498-527, United States v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., No. 1:99-cv-02496-GK (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2006), https://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2014/09/11/amended%20opinion_0.pdf.
151. Id. at 26-212.
152. Id. at 1562. The court did find that statements made by defendants to a
congressional subcommittee were protected. Id. at 1564.
153. Id. at 1571-87.
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ments could be proved using information available at the
time the statements were made.154
Regarding causation, the court focused its analysis on
the materiality of the defendants’ statements.155 Ultimately,
the court rejected defendants’ argument that no reasonably prudent consumer would have relied on the industry’s
representations, noting that defendants had intentionally
occupied a prominent position in the public discourse
regarding smoking and disease, spent millions of dollars
in advertising every year, and made statements with the
intent to influence and mislead (as shown by the industry’s internal marketing documents).156 Moreover, the court
found that the correct legal standard for assessing materiality was not whether a “reasonable” consumer would have
relied upon the industry’s statements, but rather whether
any consumers of tobacco products were likely to rely upon
the industry’s statements.157
Perhaps because the ultimate remedies in the case were
injunctive rather than monetary, the court did not enter
into an analysis of the degree to which smokers relied on
the defendants’ statements, nor did it attempt to quantify
damages flowing from reliance. Rather, the court used
multiple lines of evidence, along with reasonable common
sense, to infer broad reliance by consumers on the industry’s statements and to find those statements material to
consumer choices.
Judge Kessler’s decision in United States v. Philip Morris
Inc. provides a compelling example of how courts can infer
public reliance and causation in cases involving disinformation. However, it remains unclear to what extent the
standards of causation utilized in cases involving consumer
protection and antitrust statutes like RICO may apply to
public nuisance and failure-to-warn claims. Plaintiffs must
also establish proximate cause for tort claims. As illustrated
in the Minnesota tobacco litigation, some courts may interpret this as barring tort claims based on “derivative” injury,
but this may depend on the plaintiff and its relationship to
the defendant.158
In addition, many courts have recognized a distinction
between the “strict” requirement to establish individual
reliance for common-law fraud and misrepresentation
claims and the more “relaxed” causation requirements for
statutory consumer protection and antitrust claims.159 It
is well established that proof of individual reliance is not
154. Id. at 1502-03.
155. Id. at 1583-86.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1586.
158. Note that when the Minnesota Supreme Court denied standing to Blue
Cross to pursue its tort claim against tobacco companies, the court did not
explicitly characterize the issue as a failure to show proximate cause, but
rather a failure to establish a duty of care. See State by Humphrey v. Philip
Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 493-94 (Minn. 1996). However, the issue of
proximate cause can be inferred based on the court’s analysis of whether the
injury was “too remote” and its reliance on precedent dealing with proximate cause. Id. at 495 (citing Northern States Contracting Co. v. Oakes,
253 N.W. 371 (Minn. 1934)). The issues of proximate cause and duty are
often intertwined in tort cases. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Proximate Cause Untangled, 80 Md. L. Rev. 420 (2021).
159. See, e.g., Gregg v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 245 A.3d 637, 650 (Pa. 2021); Stutman v. Chemical Bank, 731 N.E.2d 608, 612 (N.Y. 2000).
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required under statutes such as RICO, the Federal Trade
Commission Act, and the Lanham Act, as it is not practical
to show individual reliance in actions involving the deception of large groups of consumers.160 Under those laws, a
presumption of reliance may be drawn where there is proof
of intentional deception.161 Similarly, state courts have also
recognized relaxed causation requirements for claims filed
under state consumer protection and antitrust laws.
For example, in a subsequent ruling on Blue Cross’
statutory claims against tobacco companies, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Blue Cross could satisfy the
causation element under Minnesota fraud and antitrust
statutes with circumstantial evidence establishing the general impact of tobacco companies’ wrongful conduct on
the sale and consumption of tobacco products, and that a
“direct showing of causation, as would be required at common law,” was not required.162 The court explained:
[I]n cases such as this, where the plaintiffs’ damages are
alleged to be caused by a lengthy course of prohibited conduct that affected a large number of consumers, the showing of reliance that must be made to prove a causal nexus
need not include direct evidence of reliance by individual
consumers of defendants’ products. Rather, the causal
nexus and its reliance component may be established by
other direct or circumstantial evidence that the district
court determines is relevant and probative as to the relationship between the claimed damages and the alleged
prohibited conduct. Further, in the context of the certified
question, we reject the view expressed in two federal court
decisions that our misrepresentation in sales laws require
proof of individual reliance in all actions seeking damages. . . . To impose a requirement of proof of individual
reliance in the guise of causation would reinstate the strict
common law reliance standard that we have concluded the
legislature meant to lower for these statutory actions.163

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed, finding that HMOs had provided evidence “sufficient to raise an inference that harm has in fact been
caused” through circumstantial proof, including expert
testimony and studies, on the effects of tobacco advertising and disinformation. However, the Eighth Circuit also
found that the total health care costs attributable to smoking incurred by HMOs was not an acceptable estimate of
damages caused by tobacco companies, because only a por-

160. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm’n v. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605
(9th Cir. 1993) (“It is well established” that under the FTC Act, “proof of
individual reliance by each purchasing customer is not needed.”); Federal
Trade Comm’n v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 39-40
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (empirical evidence of individual reliance on deception is
not required for FTC claim). See also Wilson & Gillmer, supra note 126.
161. See Wilson & Gillmer, supra note 126, at 598-604 (discussing this presumption in the context of FTC and Lanham Act cases).
162. Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2, 14-15 (Minn.
2001).
163. Id.
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tion of those costs could actually be attributed to fraudulent statements.164
Although nuisance is a common-law tort, there is a
sound rationale for not requiring direct evidence of individual reliance in cases alleging that a defendant has created a public nuisance through deceptive practices aimed
at misleading the broad public. These public nuisance
lawsuits differ substantially from a typical common-law
fraud claim: the plaintiffs do not allege that they relied on
a particular false statement to their detriment, but rather
that they have suffered an injury due to the effects of disinformation on the public. In such cases, a court could reasonably infer reliance from circumstantial evidence of the
efficacy of defendants’ disinformation efforts, as Judge Kessler did in United States v. Philip Morris Inc. As discussed
below, California courts have accepted public nuisance
claims without evidence of individual reliance in a public
nuisance lawsuit filed against lead paint manufacturers.

2.	

Lead Paint

In the early 2000s, local governments in various jurisdictions and the state of Rhode Island filed public nuisance
claims against lead paint manufacturers, seeking to recover
costs associated with the removal of old lead paint from
homes and other buildings, the provision of medical care
for residents affected by lead poisoning, and the development of programs to educate the public about the dangers of
lead paint. As with the tobacco cases, the plaintiffs focused
on the companies’ wrongful promotion of and failure to
disclose risks associated with their product as the conduct
giving rise to the nuisance. After many years of litigation,
plaintiffs in California managed to secure a verdict against
lead paint companies, but plaintiffs in other jurisdictions
have not yet succeeded with public nuisance claims.165
Some courts have dismissed these cases on the grounds
that plaintiffs have raised traditional product liability claims
that should not be treated as public nuisance claims,166 and
that the manufacturers were not in effective control of the
164. Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 753, 763 (8th
Cir. 2003):
Our ruling on the HMOs’ damages claims was bottomed on the
utter absence of evidence on the amount of damages, but that does
not mean that the record is devoid of evidence supporting the
fact of damage itself. Indeed, we believe that the record contains
a mountain of evidence tending to show that advertising generally causes people to begin smoking and causes current smokers to
smoke more, which increases costs for the HMOs. If one concedes
that a portion of the advertising was fraudulent, which Tobacco has
done for the purposes of this motion, a reasonable person could
infer that that fraudulent portion caused a part of those costs, even
if the HMOs’ participants differed slightly from the populations
used to study the effect of advertising generally on the prevalence of
smoking. In other words, although the evidence in the case is, as we
have said, insufficient to allow a factfinder to arrive at a reasonable
estimate of the extent of harm caused, we hold that it was sufficient
to raise an inference that harm has in fact been caused.
165. Lin, supra note 116.
166. See, e.g., In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 505 (N.J. 2007):
Even less support exists for the notion that the Legislature intended
to permit these plaintiffs to supplant an ordinary product liability
claim with a separate cause of action as to which there are apparently no bounds. We cannot help but agree with the observation that,
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premises where the lead paint was applied.167 On at least two
occasions, courts found in favor of the defendants due to lack
of causation, specifically because the courts did not accept
a market-share theory of liability, and municipal plaintiffs
had failed to demonstrate that it was the defendant’s specific
lead paint product for which the city had incurred abatement
costs.168 One case resulted in a verdict favorable to the defendants because there was credible evidence that the manufacturer did not know that the public nuisance was resulting or
substantially certain to result from its conduct.169
The California litigation illustrates how some plaintiffs
were able to establish an adequate causal nexus between the
conduct of lead paint manufacturers and the abatement costs
incurred by plaintiffs. As a threshold issue, a California appellate court held that plaintiffs had properly pleaded public nuisance claims since they were seeking abatement of a hazard
created by the affirmative and knowing promotion of lead
paint for interior use, not the mere manufacture and distribution of lead paint or a failure to warn of its hazards.170 The
court also rejected defendants’ arguments that they lacked
the ability to abate the nuisance because they did not own
or control the buildings in which the lead paint is located.171
During a bench trial, the reviewing court articulated
the following key principles:
1. The plaintiffs did not have to identify the specific location of a nuisance or a specific product sold
by defendants.
2. The plaintiffs did not need to prove reliance, since
“reliance is not an element of public nuisance claims.”
3. There was no intervening or superseding cause excusing the companies from liability.
4. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine did not apply.172

were we to find a cause of action here, “nuisance law ‘would become
a monster that would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort.’”
State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 456, 38 ELR 20155 (R.I.
2008) (“the proper means of commencing a lawsuit against a manufacturer
of lead pigments for the sale of an unsafe product is a products liability action”). See also Matthew R. Watson, Venturing Into the “Impenetrable Jungle”:
How California’s Expansive Public Nuisance Doctrine May Result in an Unprecedented Judgment Against the Lead Paint Industry in the Case of County of
Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 15 Roger Williams U. L. Rev.
612, 613-14 (2010).
167. See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d at 455 (“there was no set of facts
alleged in the state’s complaint that, even if proven, could have demonstrated that . . . defendants had control over the product causing the alleged
nuisance at the time children were injured”).
168. City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2007);
City of Chicago v. American Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005).
169. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., 2008 WI App 181, 315 Wis. 2d 443, 762
N.W.2d 757.
170. County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 328
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006):
A representative public nuisance cause of action seeking abatement
of a hazard created by affirmative and knowing promotion of a product for a hazardous use is not “essentially” a products liability action
“in the guise of a nuisance action” and does not threaten to permit
public nuisance to “become a monster that would devour in one
gulp the entire law of tort. . . .”
People v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 100CV788657, 2014 WL 1385823, at
*6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2014).
171. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 330.
172. Atlantic Richfield Co., 2014 WL 1385823, at *44.
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Because the court held that plaintiffs did not need to prove
reliance, the court focused on the defendants’ conduct in
its discussion of causation. The court discussed the content
of advertisements that recommended the use of lead paint
in homes,173 and the fact that these advertisements targeted
ordinary consumers as well as painters, tradespeople, and
paint manufacturers.174
The court also discussed findings from historical experts
regarding the number of advertisements that each defendant company had used to promote lead paint between
1900 and 1972, and examples of specific campaigns used
to sustain, increase, and prolong the use of lead paint.175
The court also cited evidence that lead paint had been sold
to California companies for home use in the jurisdictions
where claims had been filed,176 and that the defendants continued to market lead paint products despite the fact that
safer alternatives were available.177 Because the court had
found that it was not necessary to prove individual reliance
on the ads, this evidence was sufficient to satisfy the “substantial factor” causation test under California state law.178
The trial court thus found that the defendant companies
had created a public nuisance, and issued an order requiring them to pay $1.15 billion to fund lead paint abatement,
remediation, and education activities. In 2017, a California
court of appeal upheld the trial court’s determination that
manufacturers were liable for creating a public nuisance
in 10 cities and counties.179 The court rejected defendants’
argument that the harms of lead paint were “too attenuated” from the wrongful promotion of lead paint, finding:
Those who were influenced by the promotions to use lead
paint on residential interiors in the 10 jurisdictions were
the single conduit between defendants’ actions and the
current hazard. Under these circumstances, the trial court
could have reasonably concluded that defendants’ promotions, which were a substantial factor in creating the current hazard, were not too remote to be considered a legal
cause of the current hazard even if the actions of others in
response to those promotions and the passive neglect of
owners also played a causal role. The court could therefore have concluded that defendants’ promotions were the
“legal cause” of the current nuisance.180

In addition, the court concluded that it was possible, based
on the facts presented, for the trial court to draw a reason-

173. Id. at **18-19:
Defendants’ promotions included, among other things, ads (1) explicitly telling consumers to use lead paint on their homes; (2) telling consumers to use specific paints or lines of paint that contained
lead without mentioning that those paints contained lead; (3) directing consumers to stores where brochures featuring lead paint
were provided to customers; and (4) promoting “full line” dealers of
the Defendant’s paint, including the Defendant’s lead paint.
174. Id.
175. Id. at **19-20, 24.
176. Id. at **21-24.
177. Id. at *24.
178. Id. at *56.
179. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 51 (2017).
180. Id. at 104.
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able inference of harm—specifically, that at least some customers had relied on manufacturers’ marketing campaigns
in which they promoted the use of lead paint in homes and
failed to warn the public of its dangers.181
However, the court limited the judgment to homes built
before 1951, because it found that there was insufficient
evidence to support causation after 1950. The plaintiffs
had claimed that the defendants’ wrongful promotions
“sustained, increased, and prolonged the use of lead paint
in homes throughout the 20th century,” and it could
therefore be “inferred” that the promotions contributed
to the continued use of lead paint for interior use beyond
1950.182 But the court found that the plaintiffs “did not
produce any evidence of an affirmative promotion . . . of
lead paint for interior residential use after 1950.”183 Thus,
the court held that this inference was not supported by
the factual record.
The court addressed two other critical issues. First, the
court held that it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to present
proof that paint from each of the defendants was actually
located in houses within their respective jurisdictions. The
court explained:
Defendants are liable for promoting lead paint for interior
residential use. To the extent that this promotion caused
lead paint to be used on residential interiors, the identity of the manufacturer of that lead paint is irrelevant.
Indeed, the [Lead Industries Association]’s promotions
did not refer to any manufacturer of lead paint, but were
generic. What matters is whether defendants’ promotions
were a substantial factor in leading to the use of lead paint
on residential interiors. Substantial evidence supports the
court’s causation finding on that basis.184

Second, the court rejected defendants’ assertion that
they could not be held liable except in proportion to their
individual contributions to the creation of a public nuisance. The court held that “proportionality is not a causation issue,” and that “defendants may be held liable for
a public nuisance that they assisted in creating if their
wrongful promotions were a substantial factor in the creation of that public nuisance.”185 Thus, while proportionate
liability was “something that the defendants may be able
to determine by means of litigation between themselves,”
it was not necessary for the remediation plan to apportion
liability between them.186
The defendants appealed this decision, in part arguing
that it was unlawful to extend public nuisance liability
181. Id. at 103:
Further, NL [Industries] and Fuller, by explicitly instructing consumers to use their lead paints on residential interiors, played an
even more direct role in causing lead paint to be used in such a
manner. Again, the trial court could reasonably infer that at least
some of those who were the targets of these recommendations
heeded them. That is all that the substantial factor test requires.
182. Id. at 105.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 108.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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without sufficient proof of causation and reliance. In 2018,
both the California Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the petition for review.187
The California lead paint litigation thus suggests that
the plaintiffs in fossil fuel cases may be able to satisfy causation without direct evidence of reliance, at least insofar as
the facts support a reasonable inference that at least some
parties relied on false and misleading statements. It also
suggests that the plaintiffs may be able to satisfy causation by assigning responsibility for increased fossil fuel use
nationwide, or even globally, to defendants’ alleged disinformation, and not only for defendants’ branded advertising for their own products.
However, courts may reject an inference of causation in
some circumstances. In a recent California decision involving the wrongful promotion of opioids, discussed below,
the court rejected an inference of causation because the
plaintiffs had failed to delineate the extent to which the
defendant’s advertisements had contributed to medically
inappropriate prescriptions of opioids (as opposed to medically necessary prescriptions).188 It is also unclear to what
extent other jurisdictions would follow the example set by
California courts, since California appears to have adopted
a more expansive interpretation of public nuisance than
many other jurisdictions.189

3.	Opioids
Building on lessons learned from tobacco and lead paint
litigation, many states and local governments have filed
public nuisance lawsuits against pharmaceutical companies
for the wrongful promotion of opioids, seeking reimbursement for government costs incurred as a result of the opioid epidemic. In 2017 alone, more than 100 lawsuits were
filed against these companies, resulting in the creation of
a federal multidistrict litigation (MDL) in the Northern
District of Ohio.190 These lawsuits allege that the defendant
companies created a public nuisance by overstating the
benefits and downplaying the risks of opioid products.
Although most of the lawsuits are still in process, there
are some early decisions. Several courts have dismissed
cases or issued verdicts in favor of the defendant companies due to judicial determinations that the plaintiffs could
not or did not prove causation. A district court in North
Dakota dismissed the state’s public nuisance and consumer
protection claims, holding that (1) the state could not prevail with a public nuisance claim because the opioid manufacturer was not in control of the opioids at the time they
were prescribed and then used by patients; and (2) the state

187. ConAgra Grocery Prods. v. California, No. 18-84, cert. denied, 2018 WL
3477388 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2018); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. California, No.
18-86, cert. denied, 2018 WL 3477401 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2018).
188. See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text (discussing State v. Purdue,
No. 30-2014-00725287-CU-BT-CXC (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2021)).
189. Watson, supra note 166, at 614.
190. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio filed
Sept. 25, 2017).
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had not submitted adequate evidence of causation to support its consumer protection claim.191
With regard to the causation issue, the court noted that
“a generalized ‘fraud-on-the-market’ theory does not suffice to establish causation” for claims involving fraudulent
or deceptive pharmaceutical marketing (based on precedent within the state), and that the state had “fail[ed] to
identify which losses occurred by means of—i.e., because
of—any specific alleged deception or misrepresentation”
on the part of the defendant.192 For example, the state
had “not identif[ied] any North Dakota doctor who ever
received any specific purported misrepresentation made by
Purdue, or who wrote a medically unnecessary prescription because of those alleged statements.”193 According to
the court, the state needed to demonstrate at least some
instance of specific causation or individual reliance even
though this cause of action arose under the state Consumer
Fraud Act as opposed to a common-law tort doctrine.
In other opioid lawsuits, plaintiffs have provided more
specific evidence of causation and reliance on the part of
doctors. The public nuisance lawsuit filed by the state of
Oklahoma is illustrative. The state provided multiple lines
of evidence to demonstrate the effect of marketing practices on opioid prescriptions and use, including:
• Expert testimony from doctors who testified that
“the multifaceted marketing misinformation campaign by the opioid industry, including Defendants,
influenced their practices and caused them to liberally and aggressively write opioid prescriptions they
would never write today”194
• Expert testimony from medical professionals attesting to the fact that “[t]he increase in opioid addiction
and overdose deaths following the parallel increase
in opioid sales in Oklahoma was not a coincidence;
these variables were ‘causally linked’”; and that “the
increase in opioid overdose deaths and opioid addiction treatment admissions in Oklahoma was caused
by the oversupply of opioids through increased opioid sales and overprescribing since the late 1990s”195
• Expert testimony of a health commissioner who testified that “the oversupply and ‘significant widespread
rapid increase in the sale of opioid prescription medications’ beginning in the mid-1990s caused the ‘significant rise in opioid overdose deaths’ and ‘negative
consequences’ associated with opioid use, including
addiction, opioid use disorder, the rise in NAS [neonatal abstinence syndrome], and children entering
the child welfare system”196
191. State ex rel. Stenehjem v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 08-2018-CV-01300,
2019 WL 2245743, at *13 (N.D. Dist. Ct. May 10, 2019).
192. Id. at *10.
193. Id.
194. State v. Purdue Pharma LP, No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 WL 4019929, at *9
(Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 2019).
195. Id.
196. Id. at *10.
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• A report from the President’s Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis, which
found that “contributors to the current crisis” included “the use of the Porter & Jick letter” by pharmaceutical companies to make “unsubstantiated claims”;
the lack of “[h]igh quality evidence demonstrating
that opioids can be used safely for chronic non-terminal pain”; the use of the phrase “pain as the fifth
vital sign,” by the American Pain Society, the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, and others; and the fact that, “[t]o this day,
the opioid pharmaceutical industry influences the
nation’s response to the crisis. For example, during
the comment phase of the guideline developed by
the [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] for
pain management, opposition to the guideline was
more common among organizations with funding
from opioid manufacturers than those without funding from the life sciences industry”197
The state also persuaded the trial court that there were no
superseding causes that would defeat a finding of direct
and proximate cause.198
As the case was headed to trial, the state of Oklahoma
secured a $270 million settlement with Purdue and an
$85 million settlement with Teva. In 2019, the trial court
issued a $465 million verdict in favor of the state against
Johnson & Johnson, but the verdict was overturned on
appeal. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that “the district court’s expansion of public nuisance law went too far,”
and that the public nuisance doctrine “did not extend to
the manufacturing, marketing, and selling of prescription
opioids.”199 Thus, the Oklahoma verdict was dismissed due
to judicially imposed limitations on the scope of public
nuisance law, rather than any deficiency in the plaintiff’s
causation arguments.
In California, where courts have interpreted public nuisance more expansively, a trial court recently issued a verdict in favor of defendants in a public nuisance lawsuit due
to plaintiffs’ failure to show causation. The court held that
only medically inappropriate opioid prescriptions would
constitute an actionable public nuisance, and that plaintiffs had presented “no evidence to identify the existence or
volume of medically inappropriate prescriptions caused by
Defendants’ allegedly improper marketing,” as would be
necessary to determine whether defendants’ contribution
to the nuisance was “negligible or theoretical” as required
under California’s substantial factor test.200

197. Id.
198. Id. at *14 (“To rise to the magnitude of a supervening cause, which will
insulate the original actor from liability, the new cause must be (1) independent of the original act, (2) adequate of itself to bring about the
result and (3) one whose occurrence was not reasonably foreseeable to
the original actor.”).
199. State ex rel. Hunter v. Johnson & Johnson, 2021 OK 54, ¶ 2, 499 P.3d 719,
721 (Okla. Nov. 9, 2021).
200. State v. Purdue, No. 30-2014-00725287-CU-BT-CXC (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nov. 1, 2021).
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The court rejected the idea that a rise in medically
inappropriate prescriptions could be inferred from an
overall rise in prescriptions. It also rejected plaintiffs’ reliance on People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co. (the lead
paint verdict) in support of their arguments concerning
aggregate proof as it relates to causation. It distinguished
ConAgra on the grounds that it “dealt with a product,
lead paint, that had no appropriate indoor use and therefore there was no reason for the court there to distinguish
between marketing and promotion resulting in proper
versus improper uses.”201
The court did acknowledge California precedent holding that “causation may in many instances be inferred from
evidence that does not constitute direct evidence of reliance
on an individual basis” and noted that, in the present case:
Plaintiffs could have shown, or at least attempted to show,
that Defendants’ marketing and promotion caused health
care providers to write medically inappropriate prescriptions. Plaintiffs could have shown, or at least attempted
to show, singly or in the aggregate how many medically
inappropriate opioid prescriptions were written, and the
correlation between those numbers, and/or the increase
in those numbers, and Defendants’ marketing efforts.202

Thus, although the court found in favor of defendants,
the decision did not foreclose future public nuisance claims
against opioid manufacturers. A similar lawsuit filed by the
city of San Francisco recently proceeded to trial after the
court held that plaintiffs had alleged adequate evidence of
causation for their nuisance claim to support standing,203
and several of the defendants subsequently settled with
the city.204 Across the country, defendant companies have
entered into numerous settlements totaling tens of billions
of dollars, indicating that the defendants are concerned
enough about these cases to avoid trial.205
There are several key takeaways from the opioid litigation. First, what qualifies as a “reasonable inference” of
reliance or causation depends, in large part, on the circumstances of the case and the nature of the harmful product
giving rise to the nuisance. Plaintiffs may need to make
more specific arguments about causation when dealing
with a product for which there are both “appropriate” and
“inappropriate” uses. Second, plaintiffs should aim to provide as much evidence as possible—even if indirect and
circumstantial—to support causation claims even in juris-

201. Id. at *17.
202. Id. at *18.
203. City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 491 F. Supp. 3d 610
(N.D. Cal. 2020).
204. See San Francisco Reaches $54M Settlement in Opioid Litigation With Allergan and Teva, A.B.A. News (July 15, 2022), https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/health_law/section-news/2022/july/sf-reaches-54m-settlementin-opioid-litigation/; Dietrich Knauth, San Francisco Reaches $10 Million
Settlement With Endo Ahead of Trial, Reuters (Apr. 20, 2022), https://
www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/san-francisco-reaches-10-million-opioidsettlement-with-endo-ahead-trial-2022-04-20/.
205. See, e.g., Brian Mann, 4 U.S. Companies Will Pay $26 Billion to Settle Claims
They Fueled the Opioid Crisis, NPR (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.npr.
org/2022/02/25/1082901958/opioid-settlement-johnson-26-billion.
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dictions like California where the standards for establishing causation are more relaxed. Third, although “individual
reliance” is not an element of public nuisance claims, testimony of individual reliance can be used to demonstrate
causation and may be necessary in some contexts.

B.

Failure-to-Warn Claims

The foregoing discussion of tobacco, lead paint, and opioid litigation focuses on public nuisance and related consumer protection actions that most closely resemble the
tort lawsuits filed against fossil fuel companies. In many
cases, failure-to-warn claims involving these products have
been preempted by federal labeling requirements.206 Most
of these failure-to-warn actions have also differed substantially from the fossil fuel cases insofar as plaintiffs were
injured consumers rather than affected third parties (e.g.,
municipal governments or health insurers). This section
therefore considers failure-to-warn claims for a wider range
of products in order to provide insights for the fossil fuel
disinformation cases.
To establish a causal link between defendants’ failure
to warn and plaintiffs’ injuries, the plaintiff must submit
evidence that their injury would not have occurred in a
counterfactual scenario where an adequate warning was
provided.207 In cases where multiple factors contribute to
the injury, courts may apply the substantial factor test—
in which case it is sufficient for plaintiffs to show that
adequate warning would have at least partially mitigated
their injury.208
Typically, the injured consumer filing the lawsuit can
testify to how they would have behaved differently had
they been warned of the product’s dangers. But in the fossil fuel disinformation cases, plaintiffs would need to demonstrate that the failure to warn affected the conduct of
third parties (i.e., fossil fuel consumers broadly) through
documentary evidence or direct testimony. Some jurisdictions recognize the “heeding presumption,” which is
a rebuttable presumption that if a warning or instruction
had been given, such warning or instruction would have
been heeded by the plaintiff,209 but California and several
206. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that
failure-to-warn claims filed involving the advertisement and promotion of
tobacco products were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act); Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 23 ELR 20903 (4th
Cir. 1993) (holding that a consumer could bring private tort action against
lead paint manufacturers for violations of the Federal Hazardous Substances
Labeling Act, but other failure-to-warn actions were preempted by the Act).
Cf. Colgate v. JUUL Labs, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1189-90 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (holding that FDA rule preempted failure-to-warn claims for nicotine products based on the allegation that product labeling failed to warn
consumers of addictiveness, but other failure-to-warn claims—including
those based on advertisements, rather than labeling—were not preempted).
207. See, e.g., Alston v. Caraco Pharm., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 279, 285 (S.D.N.Y.
2009). See also Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Resolving the Dilemma
of Nonjusticiable Causation in Failure-to-Warn Litigation, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev.
125 (2010), available at https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1594&context=faculty.
208. See, e.g., Huitt v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453, 462 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2010).
209. States that have adopted the presumption include Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jer-
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other states where fossil fuel lawsuits have been filed have
not adopted this presumption.210
As part of the causation showing, plaintiffs must also
typically demonstrate that they would have become aware
of the warning had it been issued. A court may hold in favor
of defendants if the facts suggest that it was impossible to
issue an effective warning that would reach the consumer.
This was the basis for a California court of appeal decision
reversing a trial verdict against a natural gas company for
failing to warn users of the dangers of natural gas odor
loss. Plumbers who were injured in a natural gas explosion
had testified that they would “not have bled the natural gas
pipe serving the water heater for over two minutes (resulting in a gas accident)” if they had known that the odorant
in the gas could fade over time.211
The court of appeal agreed with this contention, but
held that the plaintiffs had failed to show that they would
have become aware of a warning if it had been issued by
the gas company. The court highlighted the difficulty of
issuing an effective warning in this context:
Plaintiffs fail to address this issue, perhaps because of the
difficulties of providing an effective warning in this case.
In many instances, a manufacturer issuing a warning has a
simple and expedient method to do so. A manufacturer of
cigarettes can print a warning on the package containing
the product. Similarly, a manufacturer of a table saw can
include warnings with its product, even placing warning
labels directly on the product. Not so here. The product,
natural gas, is conveyed over great distances directly to
the consumer through pipelines, most of which are never
seen by the consumer. In most instances, the consumer
never handles the product, but uses the product in other
appliances for the consumer’s benefit. The consumer has
no direct contact with the product itself. Even if the consumer has direct contact, the product cannot be seen.212

This requirement could bear on the ability of plaintiffs
in fossil fuel cases to demonstrate causation—the critical question being whether they can prove that consumers would have been aware of (and affected by) warnings
from fossil fuel companies. Plaintiffs could use evidence of
the effectiveness of fossil fuel disinformation campaigns to
make this point—if fossil fuel companies have been able to
affect consumer perception through false and misleading
communications, then presumably these companies could
also have affected consumer beliefs and behavior had they
issued adequate warnings about the dangers of fossil fuel
use and climate change.
Another consideration for failure-to-warn claims is that
manufacturers typically do not have a duty to warn of dangers if those dangers are sufficiently obvious such that they

sey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and Vermont, as
well as the District of Columbia.
210. See, e.g., Motus v. Pfizer Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 984 (C.D. Cal. 2001), aff’d
sub nom. Motus v. Pfizer Inc. (Roerig Div.), 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004).
211. Huitt, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 462.
212. Id. at 463.
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should be understood by the product user,213 or if there is
a “learned” or “sophisticated” intermediary who should be
aware of the risks.214 This relates to causation (e.g., if the
risks were already known to product consumers, then it is
unlikely that a warning would have affected their conduct).
Defendants in the fossil fuel disinformation cases will
likely argue that the risks of climate change were obvious
to the product consumers, which included intermediaries
(e.g., electric companies and fuel distributors) who knew or
had reason to know of those risks. However, evidence demonstrating the existence and efficacy of fossil fuel disinformation campaigns could be used to counter this defense.215
A final question is whether failure-to-warn claims are
available to plaintiffs whose injuries are not caused by their
direct use of the manufacturer’s product, but rather from
the conduct of third-party consumers who were not adequately warned about the product. As discussed in Part I,
some courts have held that only consumers or end-users
can bring failure-to-warn claims, but others have held that
this cause of action is also available to government entities
and bystander plaintiffs when they are injured by a third
party’s use of a product.216
For example, in Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., the
Supreme Court of Ohio held that the city of Cincinnati
could pursue a failure-to-warn claim against handgun
manufacturers, trade associations, and distributors based
on indirect injury, specifically “significant expenses for
police, emergency, health, corrections, prosecution and
other services.”217 The court rejected an argument that causation was “too remote,” citing three factors identified by
the U.S. Supreme Court as relevant to proximate cause
analysis: (1) the difficulty of proof was minimal, since the
city was seeking recovery for police expenditures and property repairs that were minimal and easily demonstrated;
(2) there was no risk of double recovery, since the appellate
was seeking recovery for itself only; and (3) there was no
other person available to bring suit against the defendants
for the specific damages incurred by the city.218
The court also refused to dismiss the failure-to-warn
claim on the basis that the dangers of gun violence were
“open and obvious,” because some of the allegations
“involved risks that were not open and obvious such as the
fact that a semiautomatic gun can hold a bullet even when
the ammunition magazine is empty or removed.”219 The
court thus allowed the failure-to-warn claims to proceed,
along with public nuisance and negligence claims, but the

213. See, e.g., Schiller v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 639 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 409 F.2d
1263 (9th Cir. 1969); Hopkins v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 212
F.2d 623 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 872 (1954).
214. See, e.g., Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 976 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1992); Salinero v. Johnson & Johnson, 995 F.3d 959, 965 (11th Cir. 2021).
215. See infra Part III.
216. See supra Section I.A.2.
217. 95 Ohio St. 3d 416, 428, 2002-Ohio-2480, ¶ 43, 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1149.
218. Id. at 427.
219. Id. at 425.
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city dropped the lawsuit before trial due to the expenses
of litigation.220

III. Evidence Demonstrating a Causal Link
Between Disinformation and Climate
Change-Related Damages
Based on the foregoing analysis, there are many different
types of evidence that could be used to establish causation in the fossil fuel disinformation cases. These can be
categorized into two buckets: evidence of conduct and evidence of impact. As discussed in Part II, evidence of the
defendants’ conduct can be used to infer causation. For
example, information about the nature and magnitude of
deceptive communications can support inferences about
whether and to what extent those communications reached
and influenced the target audience.
This is particularly relevant to the fossil fuel cases, since
researchers have now amassed a large body of evidence documenting the false and misleading communications of the
fossil fuel company defendants. To strengthen their causation claims, plaintiffs should also seek to provide additional evidence of impact (i.e., evidence documenting how
fossil fuel disinformation has affected public perception of
and responses to climate change). Below, we outline the
scope of existing research on both topics, and we discuss
how the plaintiffs can flesh out their evidentiary claims
through discovery, expert and fact witness testimony, and
amicus briefs.

A.

Evidence of Conduct

Historians and other scholars have amassed a large body of
evidence demonstrating that fossil fuel companies intentionally misled the public about the dangers of their products in order to protect their financial interests. Much of
this evidence comes from internal corporate documents
and peer-reviewed assessments of those documents. The
research shows that the fossil fuel industry knew about the
warming effects of GHG emissions as early as the 1950s
and developed a sophisticated understanding of the problem and its likely impacts by the end of the 1970s, but
instead of alerting the public of the dangers of their products, the industry actively coordinated and funded denial
and disinformation in order to obscure climate science,
reduce public support for climate action, and protect their
financial interests.221
The fossil fuel industry has used a variety of tactics to
obscure the dangers of their products and to create public
confusion about climate change. First, they have sought to
create doubt about scientific consensus on climate change.

220. Reuters, Cincinnati’s Council Decides to Drop Suit Against Gun Makers, N.Y.
Times (May 1, 2003).
221. See John Cook et al., George Mason University Center for Climate
Change Communication, America Misled: How the Fossil Fuel
Industry Deliberately Misled Americans About Climate Change
(2019).
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The companies have accomplished this, in part, through
outright denial of climate science—arguing, for example,
that there is a “weak evidentiary basis” for climate change,
that climate science is “junk” science, that climate science
is merely a political scare tactic, or that any human-induced
warming would be offset by a cooling effect.222
In some instances, fossil fuel companies have taken a
more subtle tactic, acknowledging that climate change
is real but downplaying its harmful effects, arguing, for
example, that impacts will not be as severe as predicted,
that climate change will actually produce substantial benefits, or that impacts can be mitigated through technology.223 The companies have also attacked the credibility and
legitimacy of scientists and institutions like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, while creating new
institutions to legitimatize anti-scientific views.224
Second, the industry has spread disinformation aimed
at casting doubt on the efficacy and reasonableness of regulations targeting the fossil fuel industry. For example, fossil
fuel companies have exaggerated the costs of GHG mitigation while ignoring or understating the costs of global
warming, overstated political barriers to climate policy,
and framed fossil fuel regulation as a threat to national
sovereignty and national security.225
Third, the industry has employed greenwashing or
“climate-washing” tactics aimed at making fossil fuelbased products and technologies appear environmentally
friendly. Examples include claims about “clean coal” and
“alternative diesel fuel.”226 They have also issued a number of misleading advertisements about their support for
“green” technologies while, in reality, continuing to spend
nearly all of their capital investments in more fossil fuel
222. Aaron McCright & Riley Dunlap, Challenging Global Warming as a Social
Problem: An Analysis of the Conservative Movement’s Counter-Claims, 47 Soc.
Probs. 499 (2000); Franta, supra note 110; Marco Grasso, Oily Politics:
A Critical Assessment of the Oil and Gas Industry’s Contribution to Climate
Change, 50 Energy Rsch. & Soc. Sci. 106 (2019); Karin E. Björnberg
et al., Climate and Environmental Science Denial: A Review of the Scientific
Literature Published in 1990-2015, 167 J. Cleaner Prod. 229 (2017).
223. Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Rhetoric and Frame Analysis of ExxonMobil’s Climate Change Communications, 4 One Earth 696 (2021); McCright & Dunlap, supra note 222.
224. See Peter Jacques et al., The Organisation of Denial: Conservative Think Tanks
and Environmental Scepticism, 17 Env’t Pol. 349 (2008); Peter C. Frumhoff & Naomi Oreskes, Fossil Fuel Firms Are Still Bankrolling Climate Denial
Lobby Groups, Guardian (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/mar/25/fossil-fuel-firms-are-still-bankrolling-climatedenial-lobby-groups; Austin Andrew, Advancing Accumulation and Managing Its Discontents: The U.S. Antienvironmental Countermovement, 2 Socio.
Spectrum 71 (2002). See also DeSmog Blog, Climate Disinformation Database, https://www.desmog.com/climate-disinformation-database/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2022) (listing dozens of organizations that are funded by fossil
fuel companies and that spread disinformation about climate change).
225. See Judith Layzer, Deep Freeze: How Business Has Shaped the Global Warming Debate in Congress, in Business and Environmental Policy: Corporate Interests in the American Political System 93 (Michael
Kraft & Sheldon Kamieniecki eds., MIT Press 2007); Benjamin Franta,
Weaponizing Economics: Big Oil, Economic Consultants, and Climate Policy
Delay, 31 Env’t Pol. 555 (2022); Fueling the Climate Crisis: Exposing Big
Oil’s Disinformation Campaign to Prevent Climate Action, Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 117th Cong. (2021) (during the
hearings, multiple oil executives framed fossil fuel regulation as a threat to
national security).
226. Clemens Kaupa, Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Misleading Fossil Fuel Advertisement in the Climate Crisis, 10 J. Eur. Consumer & Mkt. L. 21 (2021).
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production and lobbying against policies that would accelerate the deployment of cleaner energy sources.227
Fourth, the industry has created “astroturf ” organizations to mislead the public and combat climate action. For
example, in 2014, a leaked presentation from the Western States Petroleum Association revealed a stealth campaign to block climate policies in California by backing a
constellation of astroturf groups with names such as the
“California Drivers Alliance” and “Californians Against
Higher Taxes.”228
Fifth, the industry has sought to reframe the problems
of fossil fuel consumption and climate change to obscure
corporate fault. In particular, these companies have
recently focused on the role of consumers, framing climate
change as a purely “collective problem” in order to shift
the focus away from their conduct.229 This argument has
already been used as a defense to liability—the idea being
that, if everyone shares responsibility for climate change,
then there is no basis for holding specific companies liable
for climate damages.230
Finally, the industry has advertised and promoted apparent solutions to climate change that, in reality, maintain
society’s reliance on fossil fuels and thus are inadequate to
address global warming. Recent research shows this strategy was developed within and implemented by the industry
by the end of the 1980s in response to proposed fossil fuel
controls, and examples include the industry’s promotion
of natural gas, reforestation, efficiency improvements, geoengineering schemes, carbon capture, hydrogen fuel, and
biofuel.231 While some of these responses to global warming
may be beneficial, to the extent they have been promoted
by fossil fuel companies as adequate solutions or used to
distract from the need to replace fossil fuels with other
energy sources, their promotion may have misled the public regarding the actions required to halt global warming.
Much of the above information had already come to light
when the fossil fuel disinformation cases were first filed. In
their complaints, opening briefs, and expert reports, the
plaintiffs have already identified numerous examples of
how the defendants’ deceptive communications,232 and the
evidentiary basis for these claims, is growing even stronger
as the cases head to trial.233 At this point, it is difficult to
227. Id.
228. Brad Wieners, Leaked: The Oil Lobby’s Conspiracy to Kill Off California’s
Climate Law, Bloomberg Bus. Wk. (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2014-11-25/leaked-the-oil-lobbys-conspiracyto-kill-off-californias-climate-law?leadSource=uverify%20wall. See also
Neil Perry, Disinformation, No Information, Conversation (Apr. 2, 2012),
https://theconversation.com/disinformation-no-information-6228.
229. Supran & Oreskes, supra note 223.
230. See, e.g., Debra Kahn, Oil Giant Accepts Climate Consensus, Denies Responsibility for Warming, Sci. Am. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/oil-giant-accepts-climate-consensus-denies-responsibilityfor-warming/.
231. See Bonneuil et al., supra note 110.
232. See supra Part I.
233. A number of studies have been published since the complaints were first
filed that provide additional insight on the scope, timing, and nature of fossil fuel efforts to deceive the public about climate change. See, e.g., Franta,
supra note 110 (finding that the American Petroleum Institute was promulgating false and misleading information about climate change in 1980,
nearly a decade earlier than previously known); Bonneuil et al., supra note
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imagine how a fact finder could reach any conclusion other
than that the companies intentionally misled the public
about the dangers of fossil fuel use. Because the evidence
of the companies’ conduct is so robust, it may be sufficient
to allow a fact finder to infer impact, as some courts have
done in other cases involving public deception.234 However,
it would be prudent for the plaintiffs to supplement the
record with additional evidence, as discussed below.

B.

Evidence of Impact

The plaintiffs in the fossil fuel disinformation cases can use
several additional lines of evidence to establish the effect
of fossil fuel disinformation campaigns, including (1) historical and empirical evidence linking fossil fuel disinformation to impacts on public perception, media narratives,
and third-party conduct, and (2) social science research on
how misinformation and disinformation affect consumers and companies. The plaintiffs can also supplement the
existing body of research and publicly available documents
by using discovery to uncover internal corporate documents, soliciting testimony from expert and fact witnesses,
and collaborating with amici curiae who can provide additional insights on how disinformation affects the public
and consumers.

1.	

This research demonstrates the pervasive effects of fossil
fuel disinformation campaigns on U.S. policy. However, it
would not be strategic for tort plaintiffs to rely exclusively
on communications to lawmakers or direct policy effects to
support claims of causation and harm. An exclusive focus
on such evidence could lead courts to conclude that (1) the
conduct at issue qualifies as political speech that is protected under the First Amendment238; (2) government inaction on climate change is a superseding cause that breaks
the chain of liability239; or (3) the case should be dismissed
for prudential or jurisdictional reasons, such as separation
of powers, political question doctrine, legislative displacement, or federal preemption.240
Plaintiffs should therefore seek to compile evidence
of how fossil fuel disinformation has also affected nongovernmental actors and their responses to climate
change. Researchers have already demonstrated that fossil fuel companies targeted consumers and the public with
disinformation,241 and that this disinformation has infiltrated public discourse, contributed to climate denial, and
undermined public support for climate action.242 Although
the research does not always go into detail about the extent
to which changes in public discourse and opinion affected
nongovernmental conduct, a reasonable inference could be
drawn that disinformation campaigns likely reduced the

Historical and Empirical Evidence of the
Effects of Fossil Fuel Disinformation

A growing body of historical and empirical research documents the effects of fossil fuel disinformation in specific social and political spheres. For example, historical
researchers have documented various ways in which fossil fuel communications and lobbying efforts have directly
influenced climate policy in the United States, such as how
fossil fuel companies influenced the United States’ failure
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol235 and pass domestic legislation
to address climate change.236 Researchers have also demonstrated how economic consultants hired by the petroleum
industry artificially inflated the costs of climate action,
thus undermining major policy initiatives in the United
States and internationally.237

110 (finding that Exxon coordinated an international campaign to dispute
climate science and weaken international climate policy beginning in the
1980s).
234. See discussion supra Part II.
235. In addition to intense lobbying from the fossil fuel industry, conservative
think-tanks (funded by fossil fuel companies) published policy briefs undermining the science and exaggerating the costs of climate action. The tactics
deployed in these publications ranged from “outright manipulation of information . . . to more subtle ‘diversionary reframing’ . . . to define [global
warming] as non-problematic.” Many “experts” from these think-tanks also
provided testimony at congressional hearings. These efforts contributed
to the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution (stating that the U.S. Senate would
not ratify any treaty that imposed mandatory GHG emission reductions
on the United States without also imposing such reductions for developing
nations, or that might result in serious harm to the economy). Aaron M.
McCright & Riley E. Dunlap, Defeating Kyoto: The Conservative Movement’s
Impact on U.S. Climate Change Policy, 50 Soc. Probs. 348, 351 (2003).
236. Layzer, supra note 225.
237. Franta, supra note 110.
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238. See infra Section I.C.1.
239. We do not think that courts should treat the government’s failure to regulate
GHG emissions as a superseding cause based on the factors outlined in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and case law, since this regulatory inaction
was a foreseeable and intended consequence of the defendants’ disinformation efforts. See infra Section II.C.2. However, there is significant variation
in how courts deal with issues of factual and proximate cause, and we believe
that a court would be more likely to treat government inaction as a superseding cause if evidence of policy inaction was the sole basis for plaintiffs’
claims of causation and injury.
240. Characterizing government inaction as the primary route through which
disinformation efforts harmed the public and the plaintiffs may contribute
to the judicial perception that these cases implicate questions of policy that
should be left to the executive and political branches of government (or
which have already been addressed through legislation such as the Clean
Air Act). For a critical discussion of preemption and displacement issues in
the climate tort suits, see Adler, supra note 102. See also Lin & Burger, supra
note 5 (explaining why courts should not reject these public nuisance claims
on the basis of displacement, preemption, or other grounds related to the
separation-of-powers doctrine).
241. Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, The Forgotten Oil Ads That Told Us Climate Change Was Nothing, Guardian (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/nov/18/the-forgotten-oil-ads-that-toldus-climate-change-was-nothing; Supran & Oreskes, supra note 223; Supran
& Oreskes, supra note 10.
242. Robert Brulle, 30 Years Ago Global Warming Became Front-Page News—And
Both Republicans and Democrats Took It Seriously, Conversation (June 19,
2018), https://theconversation.com/30-years-ago-global-warming-becamefront-page-news-and-both-republicans-and-democrats-took-it-seriously-97658; John Cook et al., Deconstructing Climate Misinformation to Identify Reasoning Errors, 13 Env’t Rsch. Letters 024018 (2018); Aaron M.
McCright & Riley E. Dunlap, Anti-Reflexivity: The American Conservative
Movement’s Success in Undermining Climate Science and Policy, 27 Theory
Culture & Soc’y 100 (2010); Anthony Leiserowitz et al., Yale University & George Mason University, Climate Change in the American Mind: May 2017 (2017), Riley E. Dunlap, Climate Change Skepticism
and Denial: An Introduction, 57 Am. Behav. Scientist 691 (2013); Riley
E. Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, Organized Climate Change Denial, in
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society 144 (John S.
Dryzek et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2011).
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perceived incentive for effective climate responses in the
private sector as well as in policymaking.243
Various metrics can be used to gauge the effects of disinformation on civil society and public attitudes toward climate change. For example, researchers have amassed data
on the prevalence of climate misinformation in the media,
and the ways in which disinformation campaigns contributed to media outlets creating “false balance” in climate
coverage by treating climate contrarians as though their
views were equally as valid as climate scientists’.244 Researchers have also compiled data on the prevalence of climate
misinformation in other areas, such as philanthropy.245
The evidence of how fossil fuel disinformation has
affected public opinion should be sufficient to support
an inference that it also affected the behavior of nongovernmental actors. However, plaintiffs could benefit from
additional research on precisely how disinformation has
affected nongovernmental conduct.
For example, researchers could explore whether climate
denial and skepticism have affected the uptake of voluntary
measures to address climate change, including corporate
mitigation efforts and green investments, or, conversely,
whether the decrease in climate change denial in recent
years has affected the uptake of voluntary measures.246
Researchers could also evaluate consumer preferences and
purchasing trends over time and/or across different jurisdictions to better understand how disinformation may affect
consumption habits. The plaintiffs can also use discovery
tools to amass further evidence of the effect of disinformation efforts from the defendants’ internal documents, such
as internal corporate assessments of public opinion or the
efficacy of corporate communications campaigns.247
Finally, research on the contribution of climate disinformation to political polarization in the United States
also provides compelling evidence on the effectiveness of
disinformation efforts in shaping both individual beliefs
and social responses to climate change.248 U.S. polling data

243. See Nason Maani et al., Manufacturing Doubt: Assessing the Effects of Independent vs Industry-Sponsored Messaging About the Harms of Fossil Fuels,
Smoking, Alcohol, and Sugar Sweetened Beverages, 17 SSM—Population
Health 101009 (2021). See also infra Section III.B.2 (discussing social science research on how disinformation affects individuals and societies).
244. See, e.g., Justin Farrell, Network Structure and Influence of the Climate Change
Counter-Movement, 6 Nature Climate Change 370 (2016); Maxwell T.
Boykoff & Jules M. Boykoff, Balance as Bias: Global Warming and the US
Prestige Press, 14 Glob. Env’t Change 125 (2004); Michael Brüggemann
& Sven Engesser, Beyond False Balance: How Interpretive Journalism Shapes
Media Coverage of Climate Change, 42 Glob. Env’t Change 58 (2017);
Layzer, supra note 225.
245. Justin Farrell, The Growth of Climate Change Misinformation in US Philanthropy: Evidence From Natural Language Processing, 14 Env’t Rsch. Letters
034013 (2019).
246. One possible approach for such research would be to compare the uptake
of voluntary measures in the United States with countries where climate
disinformation and skepticism are not as prevalent.
247. See infra Section III.B.3.
248. See Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a
Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues From Tobacco
Smoke to Global Warming (2011); Constantine Boussalis & Travis G.
Coan, Text-Mining the Signals of Climate Change Doubt, 36 Glob. Env’t
Change 89 (2016); Riley E. Dunlap et al., The Political Divide on Climate
Change: Partisan Polarization Widens in the U.S., 58 Env’t: Sci. & Pol’y for
Sustainable Dev. 4 (2016); Salil D. Benegal & Lyle Scruggs, Correcting
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show that individual concern about climate change (and
support for climate policies) is strongly correlated with
party affiliation,249 and the United States has the highest
numbers of climate skeptics in the world.250 Researchers
have also found that disinformation efforts have targeted
conservative audiences,251 there is a well-documented relationship between conservative think-tanks and corporatesponsored climate change disinformation efforts,252 and
individuals tend to be more susceptible to climate misinformation if they identify as politically conservative.253
Thus, there is a strong basis for concluding that the
partisan divide and prevalence of climate skepticism in
the United States has been manufactured, at least in part,
through climate disinformation efforts.254 However, it is
unclear whether the defendants’ contribution to political

Misinformation About Climate Change: The Impact of Partisanship in an Experimental Setting, 148 Climatic Change 61 (2018); Aaron M. McCright
& Riley E. Dunlap, The Politicization of Climate Change and Polarization in
the American Public’s Views of Global Warming, 2001-2010, 52 Socio. Q.
155 (2011); Justin Farrell, Corporate Funding and Ideological Polarization
About Climate Change, 113 PNAS 92 (2016); Robert J. Antonio & Robert
J. Brulle, The Unbearable Lightness of Politics: Climate Change Denial and Political Polarization, 52 Socio. Q. 195 (2011); Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M.
McCright, A Widening Gap: Republican and Democratic Views on Climate
Change, 50 Env’t: Sci. & Pol’y for Sustainable Dev. 26 (2008).
249. Dunlap & McCright, supra note 242; Brulle, supra note 242; Jean-Daniel
Collomb, The Ideology of Climate Change Denial in the United States, 9 Eur.
J. Am. Stud. 1 (2014).
250. Brice Teinturier & Sarah Duhautois, Climate Change: Citizens Are Worried
but Torn Between a Need to Act and a Rejection of Constraints, Ipsos (Dec.
3, 2020), https://www.ipsos.com/en/climate-change-citizens-are-worriedtorn-between-need-act-and-rejection-constraints.
251. Brulle, supra note 242; Robert Brulle, Institutionalizing Delay: Foundation
Funding and the Creation of U.S. Climate Change Counter-Movement Organizations, 122 Climatic Change 681 (2014); Shaun W. Elsasser & Riley
E. Dunlap, Leading Voices in the Denier Choir: Conservative Columnists’ Dismissal of Global Warming and Denigration of Climate Science, 57 Am. Behav.
Scientist 754 (2013).
252. Jacques et al., supra note 224.
253. See, e.g., Arunima Krishna, Lacuna Publics: Advancing a Typology of Disinformation-Susceptible Publics Using the Motivation-Attitude-Knowledge Framework, 33 J. Pub. Rels. Rsch. 1, 14-15 (2021):
Nearly 70% of the disinformation-receptive publics (n = 257) identified as being either conservative (n = 100) or very conservative (n
= 79). On the other hand, almost 81% of those who identified as
liberal (n = 109) were part of the disinformation-immune public
(n = 88 . . .). One-way ANOVA [analysis of variance] tests revealed
significant differences across the four groups in terms of political
ideology [F(3, 624) = 77.42, p < .0001]. Disinformation-immune
publics were found to be the most liberal (M = 2.71; SD = .83)
whereas disinformation-receptive publics were found to be most
conservative (M = 3.93; SD = .94 . . .).
See also John Cook et al., Neutralizing Misinformation Through Inoculation:
Exposing Misleading Argumentation Techniques Reduces Their Influence, 12
PLOS ONE e0175799 (2017); Sander van der Linden et al., Inoculating the
Public Against Misinformation About Climate Change, 1 Glob. Challenges
1600008 (2017).
254. Brulle, supra note 242; Arunima Krishna, Motivation With Misinformation:
Conceptualizing Lacuna Individuals and Publics as Knowledge Deficient, IssueNegative Activists, 29 J. Pub. Rels. Rsch. 176 (2017); Arunima Krishna,
Understanding the Differences Between Climate Change Deniers and Believers’
Knowledge, Media Use, and Trust in Related Information Sources, 47 Pub.
Rels. Rev. 1 (2021); Arunima Krishna & Soojin Kim, Exploring Consumers’ Situational and Word-of-Mouth Motivations in Corporate Misconduct, 46
Pub. Rels. Rev. 101892 (2020); Arunima Krishna & Soojin Kim, Understanding Customers’ Reactions to Allegations of Corporate Environmental Irresponsibility, 99 Journalism & Mass Commc’n Q. 563 (2020).
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polarization could serve as a basis for liability, since courts
may conclude that polarization is a consequence of protected political speech or that the policy gridlock caused
by such polarization is a superseding cause that breaks the
chain of liability. One potential problem for plaintiffs is
that evidence suggesting that the defendants intended for
their communications to create political polarization may
be viewed by a judge as evidence that the communications
themselves are protected political speech. On the other
hand, it is possible that a court could conclude that the
defendants contributed to polarization in part through
commercial speech (e.g., advertisements) and that evidence of polarization is therefore relevant to the question
of causation.

2.	

Social Science Research on How
Disinformation Affects Individuals
and Societies

As the public has become more concerned about the spread
of misinformation on news outlets and social media platforms, an influx of behavioral and social science research
has examined the effects of misinformation and disinformation on individuals, groups, social dynamics, and political processes.255 Some of this research deals specifically with
the effects of environmental and climate disinformation.256
This research supplements the historical and empirical evidence by providing theoretical and process-based insights
on how disinformation influences individual and collective
beliefs and public discourse on climate change.
Research to date has demonstrated that misinformation and disinformation can influence individual beliefs,
increase political polarization, and decrease the quality of

255. See, e.g., John Cook et al., Misinformation and How to Correct It, in Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences 1 (Robert A. Scott
et al. eds., Wiley & Sons 2015); Gordon Pennycook & David Rand, The
Psychology of Fake News, 25 Trends Cognitive Scis. 388 (2021); Ullrich
K.H. Ecker et al., The Psychological Drivers of Misinformation Belief and
Its Resistance to Correction, 1 Nature Revs. Psych. 13 (2022); Brian G.
Southwell et al., Misinformation and Mass Audiences (2018); Alexandre Bovet & Hernán A. Makse, Influence of Fake News in Twitter During
the 2016 US Presidential Election, 10 Nature Commc’ns 7 (2019); Stephan
Lewandowsky et al., Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence
and Successful Debiasing, 13 Psych. Sci. Pub. Int. 106 (2012).
256. See, e.g., Aaron M. McCright et al., Examining the Effectiveness of Climate
Change Frames in the Face of a Climate Change Denial Counter-Frame, 8
Topics Cognitive Sci. 76 (2016); Stephan Lewandowsky, Climate Change
Disinformation and How to Combat It, 42 Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 1 (2021);
Michael Andrew Ranney & Dav Clark, Climate Change Conceptual Change:
Scientific Information Can Transform Attitudes, 8 Topics Cognitive Sci. 49
(2016); Kathie M. d’I. Treen et al., Online Misinformation About Climate
Change, 11 WIREs Climate Change E665 (2020); Ashley A. Anderson,
Effects of Social Media Use on Climate Change Opinion, Knowledge, and Behavior, in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science (Oxford
Univ. Press 2017); Björnberg et al., supra note 222. Much of the research in
this field is also concerned with techniques for addressing misinformation.
See, e.g., Daniel Bedford et al., Raising Climate Literacy Through Addressing
Misinformation: Case Studies in Agnotology-Based Learning, 62 J. Geoscience Educ. 296 (2014); Cook et al., supra note 253; Eva K. Lawrence &
Sarah Estow, Responding to Misinformation About Climate Change, 16 Applied Env’t Educ. & Commc’n 117 (2017).
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policymaking in democracies.257 This polarization effect
appears to have become more pronounced with the growth
of social media.258 Misinformation can also erode individual trust in science, and individuals with lower trust in science are more susceptible to misinformation.259
Looking more specifically at climate change, researchers
have found that misinformation and disinformation have
distorted public perception of climate issues in a manner
that has almost certainly contributed to climate inaction.260
Climate disinformation can undermine individual support for climate action by casting doubt on the veracity
of climate science and the efficacy of GHG mitigation
measures.261 Disinformation can also affect perceptions
about what other entities (including individuals and governments) are willing to do to respond to climate change,
leading people to “underestimate pro-climate positions”
among other entities and thus increasing skepticism about
the efficacy of climate action.262 Individuals who identify as
politically conservative tend to be more susceptible to the
effects of climate disinformation, which may explain the
polarization effect discussed above.263
These effects are not limited to voters and consumers—
disinformation can influence the beliefs, preferences, and
conduct of politicians, civil servants, executives, and other
individuals who have direct control over government and
corporate policies. Politicians and other authority figures
can also use disinformation to justify inaction on climate
change, regardless of their actual beliefs.264 However, as discussed above, the effect of disinformation on government
257. Joshua A. Tucker et al., Social Media, Political Polarization, and
Political Disinformation: A Review of the Scientific Literature
(2018); Andrew J. Hoffman, Talking Past Each Other? Cultural Framing of
Skeptical and Convinced Logics in the Climate Change Debate, 24 Org. &
Env’t 33 (2011); Jackson Bellamy, North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, Climate Change Disinformation and
Polarization in Canadian Society (2020).
258. Tucker et al., supra note 257.
259. See Stephan Lewandowsky et al., Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and
Coping With the “Post-Truth” Era, 6 J. Applied Rsch. Memory & Cognition 353 (2017); Jon Roozenbeek et al., Susceptibility to Misinformation
About COVID-19 Around the World, 7 Royal Soc’y Open Sci. 201199
(2020); Lawrence C. Hamilton & Thomas G. Safford, Elite Cues and the
Rapid Decline in Trust in Science Agencies on COVID-19, 64 Socio. Persps.
988 (2021).
260. See Maani et al., supra note 243; Ding et al., Support for Climate Policy
and Societal Action Are Linked to Perceptions About Scientific Agreement, 1
Nature Climate Change 462 (2011); Cook et al., supra note 242; van der
Linden et al., supra note 253; Ranney & Clark, supra note 256; McCright &
Dunlap, supra note 242; Leiserowitz et al., supra note 242; Dunlap, supra
note 242; Dunlap & McCright, supra note 242. Cf. Caitlin Drummond et
al., Limited Effects of Exposure to Fake News About Climate Change, 2 Env’t
Rsch. Commc’ns 081003 (2020) (finding that exposure to fake news only
had a minor effect on climate views, suggesting that while exposure to fake
news may once have been a driver of climate skepticism, its effects are now
overshadowed by political party and ideology).
261. Ding et al., supra note 260; Leiserowitz et al., supra note 242; McCright
& Dunlap, supra note 242. See also Michaël Aklin & Johannes Urpelainen,
Perceptions of Scientific Dissent Undermine Public Support for Environmental
Policy, 38 Env’t Sci. & Pol’y 173 (2014).
262. Matto Mildenberger & Dustin Tingley, Beliefs About Climate Beliefs: The
Importance of Second-Order Opinions for Climate Policies, 49 Brit. J. Pol.
Sci. 1279 (2019).
263. See, e.g., Krishna, supra note 253.
264. Amelia Sharman & Richard Perkins, Post-Decisional Logics of Inaction: The
Influence of Knowledge Controversy in Climate Policy Decision-Making, 49
Env’t & Plan. 2281 (2017).
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officials may be of lesser relevance in litigation contexts due
to First Amendment protections for political speech.

3.	

Fleshing Out Evidentiary Arguments Through
Discovery, Testimony, and Amicus Briefs

Plaintiffs can supplement the existing record of research
and documentary evidence before and during trials in the
fossil fuel disinformation cases in several ways. The plaintiffs can follow the example set by tobacco litigants, and use
discovery tactics to uncover additional evidence of impact
from the defendants’ own internal records. Such evidence
may include, for example, internal reports touting the success of the defendants’ advertising and public relations
campaigns and internal assessments evaluating the reach
and effect of those campaigns. The plaintiffs should cast a
wide net to capture any data or communications relevant
to the effect of the defendants’ public communications.
The plaintiffs can also supplement the record with expert
testimony on the effects of fossil fuel disinformation. The
individuals engaged in the research efforts described above
could provide insights on the historical, sociological, and
psychological effects of fossil fuel disinformation campaigns. Such testimony would be particularly useful for
communicating existing research to fact finders, and also
for fleshing out linkages between different areas of research
(e.g., explaining how general findings on the effects of disinformation can support more specific conclusions about
the effects of fossil fuel disinformation).
In addition, plaintiffs may be able to identify fact witnesses who could testify on how fossil fuel disinformation
affected their own conduct and fossil fuel consumption
decisions. For example, a corporate officer of a company
with significant GHG emissions could explain how disinformation influenced corporate policy and decisions
about GHG mitigation. Perhaps the company would have
pursued measures to reduce fossil fuel use from its direct
operations or supply chain if corporate leadership had not
been misled about the dangers of climate change.
Other potential fact witnesses would include the heads
of consumer groups and trade associations, who may be
able to testify on how disinformation affected consumers
or industries that they represent, and the heads of asset
management groups, who may be able to testify on the
fact that they would have divested or reduced investment
in fossil fuels had they been fully aware of the harms of
those products. Individuals have already begun speaking
about these issues outside of the courtroom, as evinced by
the growing number of media interviews where prominent
people have asserted that they were deceived by fossil fuel
companies and that they would have acted differently had
they known the truth.265

265. Many of these interviews are with politicians or individuals involved in lobbying and policy, and plaintiffs may be unable to rely on testimony from
such individuals due to the First Amendment issues discussed above. But
there is no reason to think that political figures are the only individuals who
could provide such testimony—other actors who have been “duped” by fossil fuel disinformation may want to speak out about these issues in order
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Amicus briefs are another vehicle through which the
courts can gain insights from experts and affected individuals on the effects of disinformation. Historians and
other researchers have already submitted amicus briefs in
some of the fossil fuel disinformation cases, where they
provide additional information about the defendants’ misrepresentations and greenwashing.266 An amicus brief may
be more appropriate than testimony for certain purposes,
such as where the insight provided to the court is based on
the collective views of numerous individuals and/or groups
(as opposed to the knowledge of a specific expert or fact
witness). In particular, it would make sense to introduce
information about the aggregate effect of fossil fuel disinformation on consumer groups and/or trade associations
through an amicus brief.

IV. Conclusion
The fossil fuel disinformation lawsuits are part of a growing
trend in litigation seeking to hold corporations liable for
the harmful effects of public deception schemes. Precedent
from tobacco, lead paint, and opioid litigation suggests
that the plaintiffs in these cases do not necessarily need to
have a “silver bullet” or “smoking gun” in order to demonstrate a causal nexus between disinformation and damages. Rather, courts may accept reasonable inferences of
causation based on multiple lines of evidence, such as the
scale and scope of deceptive communications, acknowledgements by defendants or their agents of the intended
or observed effects of such communications, and academic
scholarship on the effects of disinformation on the public.
First Amendment protections for political speech may
impose limitations on the types of evidence that can be
used to demonstrate this causal nexus.267 The best strategy
for prevailing in these cases may be to focus on the nexus
between commercial communications and changes in consumer perception and behavior, and a growing body of
scholarship can be utilized for this purpose. The plaintiffs
may also be able to use discovery tools to uncover additional evidence on the implementation and effects of disinformation campaigns, similar to the approach taken in past
tobacco litigation. Ultimately, demonstrating causation in
the context of wide-reaching and prolonged disinformation by defendants is achievable, but may require innovative and thorough analysis by plaintiffs.

to protect their reputation and/or hold these companies accountable. For
examples of interviews with people who were deceived by these companies,
see Frontline: The Power of Big Oil (PBS television broadcast 2022); Black
Gold (TIME Studios & Protozoa Pictures 2022).
266. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Robert Brule, Center for Climate Integrity, Chesapeake Climate Action Network, Justin Farrell, Benjamin Franta,
Stephan Lewandowsky, Naomi Oreskes, Geoffrey Supran, and the Union
of Concerned Scientists in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee and Affirmance,
Delaware v. BP Am. Inc., No. 22-1096 (3d Cir. filed Apr. 21, 2022); Brief
of Amici Curiae Robert Brule, Center for Climate Integrity, Justin Farrell,
Benjamin Franta, Stephan Lewandowsky, Naomi Oreskes, and Geoffrey
Supran in Support of Appellees and Affirmance, County of San Mateo v.
Chevron, No. 18-15499 (9th Cir. filed Apr. 29, 2019).
267. See Katie G. Horner, Does the First Amendment Protect Fossil Fuel Companies’
Public Speech?, 53 ELR ___ (forthcoming January 2023).

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

12-2022

